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Mental health courts (MHCs) are problem-solving courts that, 
via a separate docket, divert mentally ill offenders away from jail and 
into long-term community mental health treatment.1  By combining a 
“problem-solving orientation,” the use of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
and a redefinition of adversarialism,2 MHCs seek to reduce recidi-
vism.  Though in existence for less than a decade,3 MHCs are not ex-
perimental courts.  Rather, MHCs are successful, permanent compo-
nents of the criminal justice system, possessing documented results,4 
which have led to their blossoming in jurisdictions nationwide.5 
Despite initial success, planners and policymakers refuse to ac-
knowledge the permanent place MHCs should hold in the judicial 
landscape.6  Instead, planners nationwide establish MHCs as “pilot,” 
or temporary, programs, whose future existence is contingent on in-
numerable societal, fiscal, and political factors.  However, the popular 
pilot model of MHC creation is dangerous.  Often funded solely or 
predominantly with grant money,7 the pilot model establishes courts 
without the requisite foresight to maintain, protect, and ensure a sta-
ble existence.  MHCs established as pilot programs often face “grow-
ing pains” at the conclusion of their initial charter, as the MHCs fu-
ture becomes uncertain, often due to budgetary constraints.  
Recently, these growing pains have been experienced in California,8 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, His-
tory and Political Science, Interdisciplinary, Monmouth University.  I would like to 
thank Professor John Kip Cornwell, Sachin Bhatt, and Pat Gilmartin for their assis-
tance with this Comment. 
 1 See infra notes 111–35 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra notes 119–30 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 146–69 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 169–74 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text. 
 8 See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH 
COURTS (February 2005) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 
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Florida,9 Nevada,10 Oregon,11 Pennsylvania,12 Tennessee,13 Utah,14 and 
Washington,15 where MHC advocates scrambled to maintain current 
or find additional funding sources. 
Rather than continue the implementation of the pilot model of 
MHC establishment, planners must recognize MHC permanence, 
think prospectively, and take action to implement strategies to pro-
vide resources for the indefinite support of MHCs.  By providing for 
long-term support, an operative infrastructure, and continued main-
tenance, planners will prevent and mitigate the growing pains ex-
perienced throughout the nation, while simultaneously respecting 
and legitimizing MHC goals and missions. 
Part I of this Article explores the emergence of MHCs in Ameri-
can jurisprudence.  MHCs were the product of numerous factors in-
cluding high recidivism rates among mentally ill offenders, pervasive 
institutional problems (such as jail overcrowding, an influx of men-
tally ill offenders to jails and prisons, and an inability of correctional 
 
2005], (on file with author).  The Superior Court of California, County of Placer re-
ported that the “[s]cope of future operations [is] to be determined.”  Id.  This lan-
guage is strikingly similar to language used by the Superior Court of California in 
Santa Barbara County in the July 2004 report, indicating that due to declining fed-
eral grant money the future funding and scope of the MHC was uncertain.  See 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (July 
2004) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS JULY 2004], (on file with au-
thor).  Within a year, the Santa Barbara MHC was removed from the survey.  SURVEY 
OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra.  
 9 See Chuck Nowlen, Do We Need a Mental Health Court?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, 
Wis.), July 5, 2003, at 1A (noting the MHC in Fort Lauderdale has “been eyed lately 
as [a] potential line item budget cut[]”). 
 10 See id.  Nevada state legislator Sheila Leslie noted the state’s MHCs are feeling 
budget-cutting pressures.  Id.; see also Susan Voyles, Special Courts Face Cash Cuts, RENO 
GAZETTE-J., Dec. 29, 2002, at 1A.  Judge Peter Breen said MHCs need permanent fi-
nancing sources rather than living hand-to-mouth on grants susceptible to state and 
county budget cuts.  Id. 
 11 See Sarah Lemon, ‘Mental Health Court’ Concept Considered a Potential Solution, 
MAIL TRIBUNE (Medford, Or.), Sept. 7, 2003, http://www.mailtribune.com/arch 
ive/2003/0907/local/stories/02local.htm.  According to Circuit Court administrator 
Jim Adams, if Oregon does not pass a tax surcharge, then the Jackson County MHC 
cannot maintain existing programs.  Id. 
 12 See Nowlen, supra note 9 (noting the MHC in Pittsburgh has been targeted as a 
budget cut). 
 13 See Silvia Castaneda, Budget Cuts May End Mental Health Court for Metro, (News 2 
WKRN television broadcast June 21, 2004).  The Davidson County MHC’s grant ex-
pired.  Id.  Combined with a mayoral budget cut, the program is in jeopardy.  Id. 
 14 Elizabeth Neff, Mental Health Courts in Peril; Funding Loss Threatens Program for 
Nonviolent Offenders, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 17, 2004, at C1. 
 15 See Nowlen, supra note 9 (noting the MHC in Seattle has been eyed as a budget 
cut). 
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institutions to accommodate and treat the mentally ill),16 “McJus-
tice,”17 and judicial dissatisfaction.18  These systematic failures sparked 
MHCs’ rapid spread and evolution over the past nine years.19  But, in 
just a brief time, MHCs encountered significant preliminary success 
in reducing recidivism20 and have become a fixture in the American 
legal landscape,21 as now 113 MHCs exist in thirty-five states.22  Despite 
their prominence, MHCs, as discussed in Part II, are suffering from 
growing pains, most notably budget insufficiencies created by short-
sighted policymakers establishing MHCs as pilot programs.23  Part III 
offers a solution for the growing pains afflicting MHCs established as 
experimental: abandonment of the pilot model.  Rather than estab-
lish MHCs as pilot programs, planners and policymakers should im-
plement strategies providing the resources, funding, and infrastruc-
ture necessary to maintain MHCs indefinitely.  MHC advocates must 
think and act prospectively.  By providing for mechanisms to increase 
community support,24 diversify funding,25 maintain personnel,26 and 
create adequate infrastructure,27 court planners will create stable, en-
during, community-based MHCs.28 
 
 16 See infra notes 32–86 and accompanying text. 
 17 Greg Berman, ed., What is a Traditional Judge Anyway? Problem Solving in the State 
Courts, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 78, 80 (comments of Judge Kathleen Blatz). 
 18 See infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 99–135 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 146–69 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text. 
 22 See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS, SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH 
COURTS (December 2005) [hereinafter SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS DECEMBER 
2005], available at http://www.mentalhealthcourtsurvey.com/pdfs/Mental_Health_ 
Courts.pdf (updated periodically). 
 23 See infra notes 171–89 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 190–237 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 238–64 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 265–93 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 294–310 and accompanying text. 
 28 While calling upon planners and policymakers to abandon the pilot model of 
MHC creation in favor of establishing permanent MHCs, I do not, however, lose 
sight of the fact that MHC pilot programs are rational and may be more politically 
palatable than the alternative this Comment proposes.  For example, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court recognized that it is “rational” for a state legislature to limit a 
program’s “initial reach to a small group . . . before prescribing the same procedures 
more generally throughout the state. . . . [T]here is nothing improper about this 
method of attacking social problems of statewide dimension, as the Legislature is 
free, for reasons of necessity or otherwise, to address such issues incrementally.”  
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1090–91 (Pa. 2003).  Thus, while the 
pilot model can be an attractive option to legislators and planners, I maintain that 
such a short-sited model is not the best option. 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Need for Mental Health Courts 
MHCs are a product of a “desperation”29 confronting the crimi-
nal justice system, a desperation consisting of numerous factors such 
as a “revolving door” epidemic and the judicial dissatisfaction associ-
ated with “McJustice.”30  These systematic failures continue today.  
Specifically, recidivism is a significant problem for mentally ill of-
fenders who often make repeated visits to correctional institutions.  
Further escalating the recidivism problem is the inability of the de-
tention facilities to adequately deal with mentally ill offenders, who 
find themselves subject to detrimental forces within the confines of 
overcrowded, ill-equipped jails and prisons.  Additionally, these prob-
lems, combined with the rising caseloads and lack of tools available to 
judges, created a heightened sense of judicial dissatisfaction with tra-
ditional handling of mentally ill offenders.  These concerns highlight 
the need for continued MHC establishment and expansion.31 
i. The Revolving Door and Other Institutional Concerns 
The “revolving door” refers to the carousel mentally ill individu-
als ride: a minor, non-violent crime, followed by a court appearance, 
followed by incarceration, followed by release, followed by another 
minor, non-violent crime.  Thus, the mentally ill offender’s low-level 
crimes are “recycling problems.”32  Bruce J. Winick, professor of law at 
the University of Miami School of Law, posits that these recycling 
problems have not been adequately addressed by traditional interven-
tions.  “The traditional judicial model addressed symptoms, but not 
the underlying problem.  The result was that the problem reemerged, 
 
 29 Jenni Bergal, Justice That Works; Mentally Ill Defendants Avoid the Revolving Door of 
Jail, Get Their Lives Back on Track Through Mental Health Court’s Assistance, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 24, 2002, at 1A. 
 30 See Berman, supra note 17, at 80 (comments of Judge Kathleen Blatz); see also 
infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
 31 Lisa Shoaf, A Case Study of the Akron Mental Health Court, 32 CAP. U.L. REV. 975, 
977 (2003) (“There was no real impetus for implementing the [Akron MHC], other 
than the growing awareness that severely mentally ill individuals were increasingly 
finding themselves caught in a ‘revolving door’ in and out of the criminal justice sys-
tem and were never able to receive the assistance they required.”). 
 32 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003). 
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constantly necessitating repeated judicial intervention.”33  Statistics 
prove the revolving door’s reality,34 as 48% of mentally ill federal 
prisoners have three or more prior probations, incarcerations, or ar-
rests, compared to just 28% of non-mentally ill prisoners.35  The 
crime/court/jail/release cycle increases the “criminalization” of the 
mentally ill, whereby these offenders are continually arrested and 
prosecuted for minor offenses without receiving adequate mental 
health treatment.36  Though the revolving door is a problem unto it-
self, its broad effects generate inefficient utilization of court re-
sources, jail overcrowding, and ineffective mental health treatment.  
For example, the sheer volume of mentally ill individuals on dockets37 
causes courts to devote inordinate resources to such offenders, divert-
ing attention away from more serious, dangerous, and violent crimi-
nals.38 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding, in accordance 
with a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, that three-quarters of mentally ill inmates 
have been sentenced to prison, jail, or probation at least once prior to their current 
incarceration). 
 35 DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE 
REVOLVING DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 4 (2001), available at 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.
pdf (citing PAULA M. DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT 
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 5 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, July 
1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf); Bentson H. 
McFarland et al., Chronic Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, 40 HOSP. & CMTY. 
PSYCHIATRY 718 (1989) (noting that family members of the mentally ill report that 
such individuals average more than three arrests)).  A total of 49% of federal prison-
ers with mental illness have at least three previous probations, incarcerations, or ar-
rests.  DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra, at 4.  These national numbers are corroborated by 
local statistics.  For example, in Lucas County, Ohio, over 72% of people with mental 
illness are re-arrested within three years of their jail release.  Lois A. Ventura et al., 
Case Management and Recidivism of Mentally Ill Persons Released From Jail, 49 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1330, 1333 (1998). 
 36 See Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role 
of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 194–95 
(2002) (noting most cases criminalizing mental illness involve minor crimes, where 
the acts are manifestations of their illness and corresponding lack of treatment) (cit-
ing H. Richard Lamb, M.D. & Linda E. Weinberger, Ph.D., Persons with Severe Mental 
Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 484 (1998)); see also 
Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect 
of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972). 
 37 See generally DITTON, supra note 35 (discussing statistics regarding incarcerated 
mentally ill individuals).  Between 600,000 and 700,000 mentally ill individuals are 
annually booked in jail. 
 38 See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON, CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., CRIMINALIZATION 
OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN SYSTEM 
REFORM 2 (Jan. 2003). 
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Such negative effects travel with mentally ill offenders from 
overburdened courts to overcrowded jails.39  Since 1970, the national 
jail and prison population increased fivefold, to 1.6 million people.40  
The “critically overcrowded” incarceration system has many causes, 
including deinstitutionalization,41 the War on Drugs, and increased 
“quality of life” offense enforcement.42  In a thirty-year span, these fac-
tors quadrupled the ratio of incarcerated individuals in state and fed-
eral prisons per 100,000 in the community.43  The United States has 
the world’s third-highest incarceration rate, trailing only Russia and 
Rwanda.44 
Further escalating the overcrowding quagmire is an influx of 
mentally ill offenders,45 a prevalence that “threatens to overwhelm the 
 
 39 GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROBLEM 
SOLVING COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER 5 (2001) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM 
SOLVING], available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/prob_solv_courts.pdf 
(recognizing the surging incarcerated population). 
 40 DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Internet Report, 1999)).  Compare with Mark R. Munetz , M.D. & Jennifer L.S. Teller, 
Ph.D., The Challenges of Cross-Disciplinary Collaborations: Bridging the Mental Health and 
Criminal Justice Systems, 32 CAP. U.L. REV. 935, 937–38 (2003) (noting that in 2002 the 
population of American state and federal prisons was 1,440,655, with another 
665,475 individuals in local jails.  “As of June 30, 2002, the nation’s prison and jail 
population exceeded two million people for the first time in history.”). 
 41 See infra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
 42 See, e.g., J.S. GOLDKAMP & C. IRONS-GUYNN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING 
JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL 
HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND ANCHORAGE 
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, April 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ 
bja/mentalhealth/contents.html; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 2. 
 43 Steven Lamberti, M.D., New Approaches to Preventing Incarceration of Severely Men-
tally Ill Adults, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 1, 2004, at 33 (“The number of individuals 
incarcerated in state and federal prisons per 100,000 in the community quadrupled 
from 100 to over 400 between 1965 and 1996.  Similar trends have been noted in jails 
across the nation . . . [leading to] a combined rate of approximately 700 per 100,000 
residing in jails and prisons.”); see also Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 938 (recog-
nizing that the “6.6 million Americans incarcerated, on probation, or parole in 2001” 
represented a 258% increase from 1980). 
 44 Lamberti, supra note 43, at 33; compare with Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 
937 (noting that America’s incarceration rate of 701 per 100,000 individuals ranks 
the United States ahead of Russia as the world leader in incarcerating its citizens). 
 45 See Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 940.  According to Stephan Haimowitz, 
“although mental illness does not actually lead to legal problems, and some crimes 
committed by people with mental disabilities are not a result of their disability, many 
people do enter and remain in the criminal justice system as a result of mental disor-
ders.”  Id.  (quoting Stephan Haimowitz, Can Mental Health Courts End the Criminaliza-
tion of Persons with Mental Illness?, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1226, 1228 (2002). 
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criminal justice system.”46  Approximately 16% of inmates nationwide 
are mentally ill,47 while 30%–75% of detained juveniles have mental 
problems.48  These “shockingly high”49 percentages reflect a 154% in-
crease in the proportion of mentally ill offenders in jail from 1980 to 
1992.50  The effect of mentally ill offenders on the criminal justice sys-
tem is overwhelming.51  Approximately 250,000 severely mentally ill 
Americans are incarcerated,52 while as many as 40% of the nation’s 
mentally ill encounter the criminal justice system.53  This influx 
forced the criminal justice system to replace the mental health system 
as the nation’s primary provider of mental health treatment.54  Thus, 
 
 46 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH 
CONSENSUS PROJECT 6 (2002) [hereinafter CONSENSUS PROJECT], available at http:// 
www.consensusproject.org. 
 47 DITTON, supra note 35, at 1; see also DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3.  
Specifically, 7% of jail inmates and 14% of prison inmates suffer from schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, or major depression.  LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment 
of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Of-
fenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 257 (2001). 
 48 See also Coalition for Juvenile Justice: What’s New, http://www.juvjustice.org/ 
resources/fs002.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006)) (estimating that one half to three-
quarters of juveniles in the criminal justice system have diagnosable mental health 
problems).  Compare Symposium, The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, 29 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1758, 1777 (2002) [hereinafter The Birth of a Problem Solving Court] (com-
ments of Lisa Schreibersdorf, Brooklyn Defender Services) (estimating the percent-
age of mentally ill juveniles at 30%) with Agata DiGiovanni, The Los Angeles County Ju-
venile Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach to Crime, Violence, and Delinquency 
Among Our Youth, 23 J. JUV. L. 1, 2 (2002/2003) (estimating the percentage of men-
tally ill juveniles at 50%–75%). 
 49 BAZELON, supra note 38, at 4. 
 50 Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill Of-
fenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, (April 2001), available at http://ps.psychiatry 
online.org/cgi/reprint/52/4/477. 
 51 See Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration 
a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 157, 157–58, 202 (2000) 
(showing the direct relationship between deinstitutionalization and jail overcrowd-
ing). 
 52 Compare Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental 
Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143, 
145 (2003) (projecting the incarcerated population of mentally ill Americans at 
250,000), with Kondo, supra note 47, at 256 (projecting the population at 210,000), 
with THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THE MENTALLY ILL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS—NAMI’S POSITION (projecting the population at 283,000). 
 53 Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding, in accordance 
with the National Alliance of Mentally Ill, that 25%–40% of America’s mentally ill 
contact the criminal justice system); see also Kondo supra note 47, at 272. 
 54 John Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward 
County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14, 14 (2002) (citing Fox Butterfield, Asylums 
Behind Bars: A Special Report; Prisons Replace Hospitals for the Nation’s Mentally Ill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A1, A18; E. Fuller Torrey, Jails and Prisons—America’s New Men-
tal Hospitals, 85 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611 (1995)).  Additionally, there are three 
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in 1992, the Los Angeles County jail became the nation’s largest men-
tal institution,55 with Cook County Jail, Illinois,56 and Riker’s Island, 
New York, as second and third respectively.57  But, no matter what sta-
tistics are referenced,58 the prospects of treating incarcerated men-
tally ill offenders are bleak, as jails are referred to as: “the black hole 
of the mental health system,”59 “hospitals of last resort,”60 “surrogate 
mental hospitals,”61 “the dumping ground for the mentally ill,”62 and 
“America’s new asylums.”63 
Despite the staggering population of incarcerated mentally ill of-
fenders, correctional institutions cannot effectively accommodate or 
treat them.  In short, jail and prison facilities are inadequate for car-
ing for the mentally ill.64  Correctional institutions were never in-
tended to be mental health hospitals, thus they lack proper resources, 
 
times as many people with severe mental illness in prison as there are in mental hos-
pitals.  Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration of 
Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and Constitutional 
Principles and Therefore Cannot be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to the Insanity Defense, 5 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 17 (2005). 
 55 Watson et al., supra note 50, at 477–78 (citing Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Re-
port Focuses on Jailed Mentally Ill, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, July 1993, at 1 (noting the Los 
Angeles County jail houses 3300 inmates requiring daily mental health services)); see 
also Munetz & Teller, supra note 40, at 939. 
 56 On any day, the Cook County Jail holds approximately 1000 inmates in need of 
treatment for mental illness. Jaime Levy Pessin, Stopping the Revolving Door: New Court 
Seeks New Ways to Provide Justice to the Mentally Ill, CHIC. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 8. 
 57 Keele, supra note 36, at 196 (citing Mark J. Heyrman, Mental Illness in Prisons 
and Jails, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 113, 113 (2000)). 
 58 See Michael A. Scarcella, Charlotte County Working on Mental Health Court, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 2004, at BC1 (discussing the changing face of 
mental health treatment on a smaller scale.  “‘We’re becoming the mental health 
hospitals for the state,’ [John] Davenport [Charlotte County Sheriff-elect] said . . . . 
He noted that the February 2002 closure of the state psychiatric hospital in DeSoto 
County, G. Pierce Wood, put caring for the mentally ill in the hands of the commu-
nity.”). 
 59 Keele, supra note 36, at 196 (citing David Sapinsky, Troubling Statistics, Persistent 
Problems (ABC News television broadcast Dec. 11, 2000) (referring to comments of 
Laurie Flynn, executive director of NAMI). 
 60 DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3. 
 61 Kondo, supra note 47, at 258. 
 62 Mike O’Neal, Half of County’s Inmates Medicated for Mental Illness, CHATTANOOGA 
TIMES FREE PRESS, June 19, 2005, at B3 (quoting Cameka Sanderfur, criminal justice 
mental health liaison for Hamilton County, Tennessee). 
 63 Kondo, supra note 47, at 307 (citing House Republicans Angling to Fill Committee’s 
Vacancy, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), July 25, 1999, at 7A) [hereinafter 
House Republicans] (quoting Representative Ted Strickland). 
 64 Hamilton County, Tennessee is a prime example of this dilemma. O’Neal, su-
pra note 62.  There, 300 of the county’s nearly 600 inmates take daily psychotropic 
drugs for mental disorder treatment.  Id.  However, the doctor is only available one 
day a week and sometimes can only evaluate four patients per day.  Id. 
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facilities, and professionals to address mental illness.65  Shockingly, 
one-fifth of jails have absolutely no access to mental health services.66  
The sponsor of federal legislation promoting MHC creation,67 Sena-
tor Mike DeWine, argued that “correctional facilities simply do not 
have the means, or the expertise, to properly treat mentally ill in-
mates.”68  Thus, due to the criminal justice system’s inadequacies, 
83% of mentally ill state prisoners and 89% of mentally ill jail inmates 
do not receive treatment.69  And the minority who do receive treat-
ment must wait on long lines, without participation incentives, and be 
subjected to stigmatization.70 
This inability to provide adequate mental health treatment 
gravely affects a sensitive population.  While incarceration is unpleas-
ant, inadequate mental health care escalates the mentally ill’s stress-
ful ordeal, causing crises and a plethora of avoidable problems.71  
These poorly-cared for individuals are vulnerable to physical abuse by 
other inmates, are exposed to deadly diseases, and often commit sui-
cide.72  Such vulnerabilities and insufficient treatment cause deterio-
ration in jail.73  Ultimately, “[o]nce someone with a mental disorder 
enters the criminal justice system, it is unlikely that their mental 
 
 65 E.g., DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3; GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra 
note 42, at 60; Kondo, supra note 47, at 260; Debra Baker, A One-of-a-Kind Court May 
Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent Mentally Ill Defendants into Care Instead of Jail, 
84 A.B.A. J. 20 (1998) (noting the vast majority of jails provide inadequate, if any, 
training to corrections officer in treating mental illness); compare with Nancy Wolff, 
Interactions Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement Systems: Problems and Prospects for 
Cooperation, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 144 (1998) (stating that fewer than 
20% of jails offer any mental health services to inmates). 
 66 Baker, supra note 65, at 20. 
 67 See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 68 Kondo, supra note 47, at 259 (citing Mike DeWine, Treatment for Mentally Ill In-
mates, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES (FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE) Oct. 20, 
1999, at 1) [hereinafter, DeWine, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE]. 
 69 DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing DITTON, supra note 35). 
 70 See id. 
 71 GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42. 
 72 Baker, supra note 65, at 20. 
 73 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3–4; Kondo, supra note 47, at 306 (cit-
ing House Republicans, supra note 63) (discussing the opinion of Representative Ted 
Strickland); see also Anna B. Brutzman, Judges Push Mental-Health Court, GREENVILLE 
NEWS (S.C.), Feb. 8, 2005, at 15B (noting comments of Dave Almeida, executive di-
rector of the South Carolina chapter of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill); 
Sheila Burke, Public, Offenders Win in This Deal, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 10, 2004, at 1B. (“‘It 
[jail] was hell,’ [Hollis] Bowman-Lovejoy said.  The constant noise from the other 
inmates exacerbated her mental illness.  ‘I couldn’t sleep for three or four days,’ she 
said.”). 
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health will improve.”74  Yet, an irony exists, in that “mental health 
treatment often is a necessary component of effective rehabilitation 
and recidivism prevention programs.”75 
While jail overcrowding and the corresponding inability to han-
dle mentally ill offenders are at a crisis level, such plagues are not iso-
lated.  Rather, today’s problems are the result of yesterday’s social 
changes, which created holes in society’s safety net.76  The two major 
holes are the deinstitutionalization of the nation’s mental asylums 
and failing community treatment.  These holes promoted the shunt-
ing of the mentally ill into the criminal justice system at “an alarming 
rate,”77 in hopes that ill offenders would receive minimal services un-
available in the community.78 
Deinstitutionalization is the systematic shift of the mentally ill 
from sizeable, residential, government-run asylums to fragmented, 
community-based treatment.79  This “mass exodus” of the mentally ill 
away from psychiatric facilities and into the community has been 
“striking.”80  For example, 763,391 people, or 92%, of those who 
would have resided in public psychiatric hospitals in the 1950s were 
 
 74 James R. Walker, Comment, Getting the Mentally Ill Misdemeanant Out of Jail, 6 
SCHOLAR 371, 388 (2004) (citing Baker, supra note 65, at 21). 
 75 Richard E. Redding, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: Why 
it is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How to 
Do it), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 410 (2004); see also Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ 
Away? Will our Nation’s Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally 
Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 848 (2004). 
 76 Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 52, at 143 (citing CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra 
note 46). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Redding, supra note 75, at 409. 
 79 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 2 (defining deinstitutionalization as “a 
systematic shift in resources for treating people with mental illness—from large, resi-
dential, state-run psychiatric hospitals to community-based treatment”); see also 
Walker, supra note 74, at 373 (citing Heyrman, supra note 57, at 114) (defining dein-
stitutionalization as “the push for more community-based treatment necessitating 
discharge from state psychiatric facilities”). 
 80 Walker, supra note 74, at 378 (citing H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization at 
the Beginning of the New Millennium, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PROMISE AND 
PROBLEMS 3 (H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger eds., 2001)). 
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not housed there by the 1990s.81  Thus in 2000, only 54,836 mentally 
ill individuals were institutionalized.82 
Despite the last half century’s deinstitutionalization, community 
mental health treatment has not accommodated the massive patient 
increase.83  MHCs are reactive to the mental health system’s failures:84 
failures due to lacking resources, services, and funding.85  Judge Mark 
Chow of the King County Mental Health Court said, “If there were 
sufficient services out there in the community, we wouldn’t need 
mental health court.”86  Thus, the irony is clear: MHCs divert mentally 
ill offenders into treatment, but if treatment were effective, such indi-
viduals would not offend. 
ii. “McJustice” and Judicial Dissatisfaction 
While the revolving door faced by the mentally ill strained the 
criminal justice system’s resources, judicial dissatisfaction with “tradi-
tional” handling of mentally ill offenders simultaneously increased.  
This dissatisfaction prompted the expansion of problem-solving jus-
tice and MHCs.  Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota posits: 
[T]he innovation that we’re seeing now (the rise of problem-
solving courts) is a result of judges processing cases like a vegeta-
 
 81 Kondo, supra note 47, at 269 (citing E. Fuller Torrey, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: 
CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 8–9 (1997)).  Compare with DENCKLA & 
BERMAN, supra note 35, at 3 (citing Terry Kupers, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL 
HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT, 1999) (estimating that 
in 1955, 560,000 mentally ill individuals were institutionalized, compared to less than 
80,000 in 1999). 
 82 Bergal, supra note 29 (referencing the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services).  Deinstitutionalization has continued into the twenty-first cen-
tury as well.  For example, Dr. Gerald Ross, executive director of the Charlotte 
Community Mental Health Services, cites the 2002 closing of G. Pierce Wood, a De-
Soto County, Florida, psychiatric hospital, as a reason causing increased jailing of 
mentally ill individuals.  Amy Abern, Program Provides Outlet, Safety for Mentally Ill; 
Through Art and Individual Attention, the DOORS Program Helps Break a Vicious Cycle, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 29, 2005, at BC1. 
 83 See Pessin, supra note 56, at 8 (recognizing that community mental health treat-
ment did not increase as the number of hospital beds decreased during deinstitu-
tionalization). 
 84 See BAZELON, supra note 38, at 2 (“As communities grapple with this fallout 
from unresponsive mental health and social services systems, reforms are being pro-
posed.”). 
 85 Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts, 89 A.B.A. J. 32, 37 (2003) 
(quoting Oscar Morgan, senior consultant for mental health policy and programs at 
the National Mental Health Association: “We believe that the mental health courts 
are in some ways an outgrowth of the fact that mental health services are under-
funded.”). 
 86 Id. 
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ble factory.  Instead of cans of peas, you’ve got cases.  You just 
move ‘em, move ‘em, move ‘em.  One of my colleagues on the 
bench said: “You know, I feel like I work for McJustice: we sure 
aren’t good for you, but we are fast.”87 
Judges are dissatisfied.  Dissatisfied with their tools.  Dissatisfied 
with their assignments.  Dissatisfied with the “revolving door” of 
criminal justice.88  Stories of despair abound.89  For Judge Judy Harris 
Kluger, a New York City Criminal Court Administrative Judge, it was 
the sheer volume of crime.  She once arraigned 200 cases in a single 
session, too busy to look up and view the defendants before her.90  For 
Judge Laura Ward, of the Manhattan Treatment Court, it was recog-
nizing that the status quo was unproductive.  “Sitting in arraignments, 
I quickly realized that jail wasn’t the answer.  You’d put them in jail 
on Monday for a crack pipe, only to have them back in court on 
Wednesday for something new.”91  Ultimately, judges, like Kluger and 
Ward, desired a better system.  Patrick McGrath, Deputy District At-
torney of San Diego, sums up judicial dissatisfaction, stating: 
I think it’s fair to say there’s a sense of yearning out there.  If you 
grab a judge, a defense attorney and prosecutor and sat them 
down together and bought them a round of drinks, after a few 
beers, they’ll all complain about the same thing: “I have all this 
education and what do I do?  I work on an assembly line.  I don’t 
affect case outcomes.”  I think in a lot of ways problem-solving 
courts are addressing all of our yearning to do more than just 
process cases.92 
 
 87 Berman, supra note 17, at 80. 
 88 See GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 21 (2002) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES], 
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/judges_problem_solving_courts. 
pdf. 
 89 For example, Judge Legrome Davis, a Philadelphia criminal court judge, sen-
tenced, in one year, 5000 pleading felons.  Berman, supra note 17, at 80.  For the 
next half decade, he watched those 5000 individuals repetitively offend.  Id.  Santa 
Clara drug court’s Judge Stephen V. Manley felt the system failed individuals and 
families.  BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21–22.  “When you begin 
sentencing the children of those you sentenced . . . you have to ask yourself, ‘Have 
you made any change?’ . . . [Y]ou begin to question why we’re doing the same thing 
over and over again.”  Id. 
 90 Berman, supra note 17, at 81 (“[M]y claim to fame was that I arraigned 200 
cases in one session.  That’s ridiculous.  When I was arraigning cases, I’d be handed 
the papers, say the sentence is going to be five days, ten days, whatever, never even 
looking at the defendant.”). 
 91 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21. 
 92 John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla eds., What Does it Mean to be a Good Lawyer? 
Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 206, 209. 
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Judicial dissatisfaction traces back to rising caseloads.  State 
court case filings reached 91.5 million in 1998, an all-time high.93  In 
New York City alone, the misdemeanor caseload increased by 85% in 
the decade following 1989.94  This upsurge was consistent with na-
tional trends, as from 1984 to 1998 criminal filings increased 50%.95  
The caseload volume overwhelmed courts,96 transforming courtrooms 
into “plea bargain mills” which value efficiency: maximum volume, 
minimum time.97  According to Judge Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of 
New York State, the “volume of our dockets demands efficient man-
agement.  But processing more cases more quickly isn’t the whole an-
swer.  We also need to take a step back and ask ‘Is there a better way 
to do this?’  In fact, across the country, some judges are starting to re-
think business as usual.”98 
B. The Birth of Mental Health Courts 
Over the past two decades, the Sunshine State was a legal inno-
vation laboratory.  By establishing the nation’s first drug court in 
1989, Dade County, Florida became the birthplace of modern prob-
lem-solving justice.99  Only eight years later, spurred by the success of 
drug courts nationally,100 the country’s first MHC commenced in 
Broward County.101 
 
 93 Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Justice: A Quiet Revolution, 
JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 182 [hereinafter Berman & Feinblatt, A Quiet Revolu-
tion]. 
 94 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 6 (citing Greg 
Rohde, Crackdown on Minor Offenses Swamps New York City Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
1999, at A1). 
 95 David B. Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized Courts 
(and Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 25 (2000).  Compara-
tively, the United States population grew by only 15% over the same time period.  Id. 
 96 Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as Problem Solv-
ing and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
11, 26 (2004) (citing Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeal: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 542–49 
(1969)) (“[T]he number of criminal cases overwhelmed court systems.”). 
 97 See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 7 (citing Judge 
Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13). 
 98 Kaye, supra note 97, at 13. 
 99 E.g., AUBREY FOX & ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE FUTURE 
OF DRUG COURTS: HOW STATES ARE MAINSTREAMING THE DRUG COURT MODEL 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/future_of_drug_courts.pdf. 
 100 See DiGiovanni, supra note 48, at 8 (“The success of drug courts has been influ-
ential in the recent emergence of mental health courts across the nation.”). 
 101 GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42.  By administrative order of Chief 
Judge Dale Ross, the Broward County MHC began operation on June 6, 1997.  Id. 
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Despite Florida’s predilection for jurisprudential innovation, the 
catalyst for the nation’s first MHC was Aaron Wynn.  In the mid-
1980’s, Wynn suffered brain damage in a motorcycle accident.102  De-
spite attempts to access viable treatment in the mental health and 
criminal justice systems, Wynn’s anger was uncontrollable, precipitat-
ing a 1993 incident where Wynn knocked down and killed an 85-year-
old woman outside a grocery store.103  Wynn was charged with man-
slaughter,104 and the MHC movement inauspiciously began.105 
The next year, Broward County received a “scathing grand jury 
report” concerning “severe shortfalls” in the county’s mental health 
system.106  Combined with Wynn’s high-profile crime, the report 
forced Broward County to act, leading to the 1994 creation of a multi-
agency task force.107  The ad hoc committee of various county stake-
holders, led by Judge Mark A. Speiser, proposed the establishment of 
a MHC.108  Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren, the first judge to preside over 
 
 102 See, e.g., Bergal, supra note 29. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See, e.g., id. 
 105 High-profile crime has been a common spark for MHC creation.  Kondo, supra 
note 47, at 302 (“At times, a newsworthy criminal event triggers immediate public 
awareness for the need for specialized courts.”).  For example, in King County, Wash-
ington, a retired firefighter was murdered by a man with a violent history and multi-
ple psychiatric hospitalizations.  JOHN R. NEISWENDER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES FOR KING COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 2 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.metrokc.gov/KCDC/mhcsum32.pdf.  The crime was committed 
within two weeks of a jail release on a misdemeanor charge.  Id.  “The incident gal-
vanized the community and became the impetus for the formation of a task force 
that studied how the mentally ill defendant was treated in the criminal justice sys-
tem.”  Id.  Charlotte County, Florida, is currently planning an MHC.  Id.  Officials cite 
the June 2004 murder of a seven year-old girl in a motel room as the court’s catalyst.  
Id.  The girl’s mother, who had a lengthy history of mental illness, later confessed to 
the homicide.  Id.  This trend may continue.  See Kate Gurnett, Mental Health Court 
Possible, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), June 9, 2005, at B1 (noting that Albany, 
New York officials are considering creating a MHC following three incidents since 
1995 of mentally ill mothers murdering their children); Jeff Long, Mental Health 
Court is Studied; Woodstock Slaying Might Have Been Averted, Official Says, CHI. TRIBUNE, 
July 15, 2005, at 1 (noting that DuPage County, Illinois, has formed a task force to 
study the creation of a MHC, prompted, in part, by an alleged murder committed by 
a man suffering from bipolar disorder, who doused a woman with gasoline and set 
her ablaze). 
 106 JUDGE GINGER LERNER-WREN, BROWARD’S MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN 
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 
(2000), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_Fla 
MentalPub.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. 
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the Broward County MHC,109 said, “[t]he court came to be out of 
desperation.  But it has turned out to be a great vehicle.”110 
C. The Mental Health Court Model 
MHCs are problem-solving courts111 that, via a separate docket,112 
use judicial process to divert mentally ill offenders away from jail and 
into long-term community mental health treatment.113  By avoiding 
incarceration, MHCs use a multi-disciplinary approach to treat the 
underlying, or “root,”114 cause of the offender’s criminal conduct: 
mental illness.115  According to Associate Judge Lawrence P. Fox, of 
 
 109 Judge Lerner-Wren was formerly the county’s public guardian, responsible for 
overseeing the health and welfare of incapacitated adults, and oversaw the imple-
mentation of an agreement improving conditions within South Florida State Hospital 
and surrounding community mental health systems.  Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 
16; see also Bergal, supra note 29. 
 110 Bergal, supra note 29. 
 111 There is no clearly articulated definition or philosophy that unites all problem-
solving justice practitioners.  BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, 
at 3.  However, problem-solving courts are, generally, collaborative, holistic courts 
that seek to resolve the root causes of conflicts via an interdisciplinary approach.  
The specific issues facing problem-solving courts (drug use, domestic violence, men-
tal health, etc.) are modern, persistent issues, resulting from social, legal, and per-
sonal problems that traditional courts are ill-equipped to handle.  With an orienta-
tion toward the future and design to seek tangible outcomes, judicial authority 
combines punishment and treatment to reduce recidivism, increase efficiency, and 
increase public safety. See Winick, supra note 32, at 1055, 1061; see GREG BERMAN & 
JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
4 (2002), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/judges_problem_solving_ 
courts.pdf; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 7. 
 112 Faraci, supra note 75, at 825. 
 113 See Winick, supra note 32, at 1059 (“Mental health courts seek to divert [the 
mentally ill offenders] from the criminal justice system and to persuade them to vol-
untarily accept treatment while in the community.”) (citing GOLDKAMP & IRONS-
GUYNN, supra note 42; Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 14–15). 
 114 Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 
5 (2002); see also Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving Courts 
into the Mainstream: A Report Card from the CCJ-COSCA Problem Solving Court Committee, 
39 CT. REV. 4 (2002) (“[P]roblem-solving courts generally focus on the underlying 
chronic behaviors of criminal defendants”). 
 115 See Bruce J. Winick, Preventative Outpatient Commitment for Persons With Serious 
Mental Illness: Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 107, 126 (2003). Mental illness, not criminality, is the root cause of 
many offenses by mentally ill individuals. 
However structured, the mental health court proceeds on the assump-
tion that, for at least some defendants charged with minor, non-violent 
offenses, the problem is more a product of mental illness than of 
criminality, and that facilitating the offender’s access to and engage-
ment in mental health treatment constitutes a more effective response 
to the underlying problem than would criminal conviction and sen-
tence.   
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the Cook County, Illinois, MHC, “It’s innovative and appropriate for 
criminal justice to recognize we have a lot of people in jail more be-
cause of their mental illness than their criminality . . . . They need 
treatment more than they need to be in jail, more than they need to 
be punished.”116  In short, MHC’s focus is on therapeutic interven-
tion, not prosecution.117  Though MHCs vary greatly in their daily op-
erations, eligibility requirements, and procedural safeguards,118 they 
share unifying characteristics.  First, MHCs possess a “problem-solving 
orientation,” requiring unique success measurements.119  Thus, rather 
than evaluating effectiveness by traditional criteria (such as convic-
tions), MHC stakeholders assess achievement in terms of treatment 
provision and illness mitigation.120  By addressing systematic problems 
through novel methods and measurements, MHCs demonstrate dis-
satisfaction with standard case processing and “business as usual.”121 
Second, MHCs use “therapeutic jurisprudence.”122  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence123 is an interdisciplinary legal approach emphasizing 
the creation of beneficial consequences via legal actors, rules, and 
 
     Mental health courts represent a multi-agency and systemwide re-
sponse to the problem of untreated mental illness . . . . 
Id.; see also Winick, supra note 32, at 1059.  Broward County’s MHC is a misdemeanor 
court for “people arrested for minor offenses whose major problem is mental illness 
rather than criminality.”  Id. (citing Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 15–16). 
 116 Pessin, supra note 56, at 8.  “By acknowledging that crime isn’t always a func-
tion of a person’s nefarious intentions, courts are passing up on punishment in favor 
of therapy.”  Id. 
 117 O’Neal, supra note 62. 
 118 See GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42. 
 119 See GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE HARDEST SELL? PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGES OF STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/hardest_sell.pdf (noting the problem-
solving orientation requires a “significant shift in judicial orientation”). 
 120 See id.; see also Jennifer Skeem & John Petrila, Problem-Solving Supervision: Spe-
cialty Probation for Individuals with Mental Illnesses, 40 CT. REV. 8 (2004) (recognizing 
that problem-solving courts attempt to achieve outcomes that extend beyond the ju-
dicial system’s traditional goals, thus responding to larger social problems invading 
on the justice system). 
 121 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 8 (citing HOWARD FINKELSTEIN & 
DOUGLAS BRAWLEY, BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, INTRODUCTION; 
BROWARD COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT STATUS REPORT (1997), http://www. 
browarddefender.com/mhealth/volume_i_mental_health.htm#VolI,No.I (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2006)). 
 122 Id. at 9. 
 123 The therapeutic jurisprudence theory was first coined in 1987 by Professor 
David Wexler in a paper to the National Institute of Mental Health.  Peggy Fulton 
Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolution-
izing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 439, 442 n.8 (1999). 
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procedures.124  Fundamental to therapeutic jurisprudence is a notion 
that therapeutic options (options promoting mental health that 
compliment judicial values), improve efficacy by serving individuals 
and their problems.125  Thus, in various manners, MHCs direct atten-
tion away from the docket’s binary dispute and towards the offender’s 
and community’s needs.126 
Third, MHC legal actors perform non-traditional roles, redefin-
ing adversarialism and relaxing courtroom proceedings.127  These 
modern roles require increased judicial monitoring of MHC partici-
pants, as offenders frequently return to court allowing judicial as-
sessment of their treatment’s progression.128  The interaction with the 
bench is consistent with therapeutic jurisprudence, as judges directly 
engage participants, encouraging modified behavior.129  This active 
judiciary is consistent with the problem-solving approach of handling 
difficult situations and not delegating problems to other governmen-
tal actors.130 
 
 124 See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Justice, Ethics, and Interdiscipli-
nary Teaching and Practice: Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A 
Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 137 (2004) 
(citing ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xi (David B. Wexler and Bruce J. 
Winick eds., 1991) (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence “asks how the law itself 
might serve as a therapeutic agent without displacing due process”)). 
 125 See LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 
1996). 
Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such as law-
yers and judges) constitute social forces that, like it or not, often pro-
duce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic juris-
prudence proposes that we be sensitive to those consequences, and 
that we ask whether the law’s antitherapeutic consequences can be re-
duced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordi-
nating due process and other justice values. 
Id.; see also Rottman, supra note 95, at 22 (recognizing that a problem-solving orienta-
tion is more appropriate and effective for cases involving mental illness); David 
Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem-Solving 
Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 12, 14 (July 1999) (“Therapeutic jurisprudence claims that 
attending to the individuals as well as the issues involved in a case leads to more ef-
fective dispositions.”) (citing Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral 
Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 194, 195 (1991)). 
 126 E.g., Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 14. 
 127 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 9 (noting MHCs have a non-
adversarial dynamic).  This non-adversarial dynamic is also highlighted by the col-
laboration among parties to MHC proceedings.  Nancy J. Needell, M.D. & Judge Mat-
thew D’Emic, The Brooklyn Mental Health Court—A Collaborative Effort, PSYCHIATRIC 
TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 10. 
 128 See, e.g., Needell & D’Emic, supra note 126. 
 129 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 119, at 3. 
 130 Center for Court Innovation, http://www.problem-solvingcourts.org/ps_char. 
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) (recognizing propensity of traditional courts to pass-
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In addition to the three common characteristics, MHCs share a 
common vision.  At its broadest, the purpose of MHCs is to qualita-
tively improve individual and social outcomes for offenders with un-
derlying mental illnesses.131  However, secondary goals abound.  
MHCs desire to improve public safety and formulate compassionate 
treatment for mental disorders.132  MHCs seek to decriminalize men-
tal illness,133 while reducing recidivism.134  Ultimately, these secondary 
objectives seek to end the mental illness/criminal behavior cycle by 
providing viable treatment in lieu of criminal sanctions.135 
D. Mental Health Court Proliferation 
Recognizing the extensive criminal justice problems associated 
with mental illness and the “positive results” 136 of early MHCs in Bro-
ward County, Florida and King County, Washington, the federal gov-
ernment acted.  Congress enacted “America’s Law Enforcement and 
Mental Health Project,” which President Bill Clinton signed on No-
vember 13, 2000.137  The bipartisan Act, sponsored by Senator Mike 
 
off cases to other courts, probation departments, etc.).  According to Martha Metter, 
a community support worker with the Crider Center for mental health in St. Charles 
County, Missouri, the county’s mental health drug court team is “a little family” that 
actively supports the court’s clients.  Valerie Schremp Hahn, Court Helps Troubled Peo-
ple: County’s New Mental Health Court Provides Clients With What May be the First Stable 
Relationship of Their Lives, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 6, 2005, at 1. 
 131 Rottman, supra note 95, at 22 (“The purpose of the new specialized courts is to 
qualitatively improve outcomes for litigants and society in cases involving individuals 
with underlying social and emotional problems.”).  Further, the King County MHC 
mission statement states, “the purpose of the mental health court is to insure that 
mentally ill people are treated with dignity and provided with the opportunity for 
treatment while at the same time protecting the public’s safety” and “preventing 
criminalization of the mentally ill.”  Faraci, supra note 75, at 824. 
 132 See NEISWENDER, supra note 105, at 2. 
 133 See Nancy Bartley, Help, Not Punishment, for Mentally Ill: King County’s Mental 
Health Court Making a Difference, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at B1. 
 134 See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 35, at 7; Bartley, supra note 133. 
 135 BAZELON, supra note 38, at 5. 
The goals of these mental health courts, then, are 1) to break the cycle 
of worsening mental illness and criminal behavior that begins with the 
failure of the community health system and is accelerated by the in-
adequacy of treatment in prisons and jails and 2) to provide effective 
treatment options instead of the usual criminal sanctions for offenders 
with mental illnesses. 
Id.; see also Shoaf, supra note 31, at 976, 988 (stating the Akron MHC’s goal “is to 
transition the client from a highly restrictive environment involving intensive case 
management to a much less restrictive environment involving minimal case man-
agement.”  Stated more simply, the MHC’s goal is “to divert mentally ill non-violent 
repeat offenders from jail and into treatment.”). 
 136 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796ii (LEXIS through Jan. 11, 2006). 
 137 E.g., id.; Keele, supra note 36, at 197. 
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DeWine and Representative Ted Strickland,138 made federal funds 
available to localities establishing or expanding MHCs.  The Attorney 
General gained authority to grant funds to 100 programs that involve, 
“continuing judicial supervision, including periodic review, over pre-
liminarily qualified offenders with mental illness . . . ; and the coor-
dinated delivery of services,” including: specialized stakeholder train-
ing; voluntary outpatient mental health treatment; centralized case 
management; and continued treatment supervision.139  Since then, 
the federal program, which makes ten million dollars available per 
year from 2001–2004, provided grants to thirty-seven courts in 2002 
and 2003.140  This legislative action propelled an MHC explosion,141 as 
by December 2005, 113 MHCs existed in thirty-five states.142 
The number of MHCs may again expand due to federal legisla-
tion.  Sponsored by Senators DeWine and Dick Durbin and signed 
into law by President George W. Bush, the “Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004”143 created a new, five-
year grant program to fund states and localities seeking to establish 
mental health courts, provide in-jail treatment and transitional ser-
vices, and provide training to mental health court stakeholders.144  
 
 138 Watson et al., supra note 50, at 480. 
 139 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796ii (LEXIS through Jan.11, 2006).  The Act calls for the crea-
tion of programs to train court and law enforcement personnel to recognize men-
tally ill offenders, to provide voluntary mental health treatment as a diversion from 
criminal sanctions, to centralize case management by coordinating treatment plans 
with the provision of social services, and to provide continuity in psychiatric care af-
ter release.  Id. 
 140 See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8. 
 141 The proliferation of MHCs mimics the proliferation of drug courts.  BERMAN & 
FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 5.  For example, in 1989, the first 
drug court was opened in Dade County, Florida.  Id. at 4.  Five years later, the Crime 
Act was passed, authorizing the Attorney General to make grants to establish drug 
courts.  Id.  As of October 2003, 1091 drug courts existed, with another 413 in the 
planning stages.  Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From In-
novation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1503 (2003) (citing OJP 
DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, DRUG COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE: OCT. 15, 2003).  But see 
Pessin, supra note 56, at 8 (numbering drug courts nationwide at 1800).  Since their 
inception, more than 226,000 defendants have participated in drug court-related 
programs.  Aubrey Fox & Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A Conversation About the Future 
of Drug Courts, 39 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2002).  The speed of drug court proliferation has 
been called “break-neck.”  Faraci, supra note 75, at 811. 
 142 See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS DECEMBER 2005, supra note 22 (defining 
MHCs as “courts that: are adult criminal courts; have a separate docket dedicated to 
persons with mental illnesses; divert criminal defendants from jail into treatment 
programs; and monitor the defendants during treatment and have the ability to im-
pose criminal sanctions for failure to comply.”). 
 143 42 U.S.C.S. § 3797aa (LEXIS through Jan.11, 2006). 
 144 Id. 
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Most notably, the Act authorizes the Department of Justice to appro-
priate fifty million dollars in 2005, with additional grant funding for 
2006 to 2009 to be determined.145 
E. Mental Health Court Effectiveness 
MHCs did not proliferate simply due to federal funding.  MHCs 
also grew exponentially due to their effectiveness,146 specifically in re-
ducing recidivism.147  For example, Broward County’s MHC signifi-
cantly mitigated revolving door problems.148  Notably, from October 
2001 to September 2002, only 27% of MHC participants were rear-
rested.149  Further, none of the first 675 participants have since com-
 
 145 Id. § 3797aa(h). 
 146 Idaho State Senator Dick Compton said of his state’s two MHCs in Coeur 
d’Alene and Idaho Falls, which both began on an experimental basis: “Once in a 
while a gem comes along that you say, ‘Thank God,’. . . . The figures are extraordi-
nary—from people not in jail to people who go to work, believe it or not, after living 
under a bridge.  Josh Wright, Mental Health Courts Win Senate Approval; Bills Would Ex-
pand Program Statewide, Provide Funding, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 30, 
2005, at B2.  Anecdotal evidence verifying the impact of MHCs is abundant.  For ex-
ample, during a Nevada Senate Human Resources and Education Subcommittee 
meeting, Walter Bliss, the father of a schizophrenic man who, after numerous en-
counters with law enforcement, was placed into the Clark County Mental Health 
Court, said: “This mental health court is absolutely necessary.  It is so relaxing for us 
to have some peace in our life and know that (our son) is having the care that he 
needs.”  Sean Whaley, Clark County: Praises Sung for Mental Health Court, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J., Feb. 19, 2005, at 4B.  A more recent example is the case of a twenty-five year-
old immigrant from Barbados who participated in the Brooklyn MHC.  Leslie Eaton 
& Leslie Kaufman, Judges Turn Therapist in Problem-Solving Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2005, at A1.  According to Mary Elizabeth Anderson, a lawyer with the Legal Aid So-
ciety, “He would have been in jail without . . . [the MHC], there is no doubt.” Id. 
 147 See Kondo, supra note 47, at 302 (“[V]isionary political leaders may pioneer 
state judiciary experimentation based upon past successes reported by other specialty 
courts in distant jurisdictions.”); see also Clay Barbour, Court Doles Out Compassion, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 2005, at A1 (quoting Marcia Wikenhauser, executive 
director of Madison County’s Mental Health Board, “[MHCs] only make sense . . . . 
They get people into treatment, rather than letting them languish in jail.”).  Addi-
tionally, Judge Michael McLaughlin stated that, as to recidivism, MHC “participants 
have six times the success of defendants diagnosed with mental illnesses but who do 
not go through mental health court.”  Michael McLaughlin, Mental Health Court Bene-
fits Defendants, Our Community, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 6, 2005, at 6. 
 148 See Timothy Dodson, Face to Face: A Conversation with Ginger Lerner-Wren, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 30, 2005, at 5H.  According to Judge Wren, the 
current recidivism rate for mentally ill offenders in Broward County’s MHC is ap-
proximately 12%.  Id.  This is a significant decrease from the court’s earlier recidi-
vism percentage which was approximately 30%.  Bergal, supra note 29.  “It’s awesome 
that seven out of 10 aren’t re-offending . . . . It demonstrates that treatment works 
and recovery is possible. [This recidivism rate is] surprisingly low.”  Id. 
 149 Bergal, supra note 29. 
ACQUAVIVA FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  3:02:08 PM 
2006] COMMENT 991 
mitted a violent offense.150  This reduced recidivism cleared Broward 
County’s jail of an entire inmate class: the mentally ill non-violent 
misdemeanant.151 
Additionally, King County, Washington, another “original” 
MHC,152 slowed the revolving door, drastically reducing recidivism.  
Recidivism appreciably decreased, as 75% of King County MHC 
graduates committed no offenses in the year following their gradua-
tion, while 85% committed one offense or less in that time period.153  
Declining crime reduced violence, as the occurrence of violent 
criminal activity among MHC participants decreased by nearly 88%.154  
These reductions had noteworthy institutional effects, as jail time de-
creased by over 90%.155 
Impressive recidivism reduction has not been limited to the 
founding MHCs.  Rather, triumphs occurred nationwide.  In David-
son County, Tennessee, mentally ill recidivism rates dropped by 50%, 
now down to 5.2%.156  In Downtown Brooklyn, probation violations 
for MHC clients is 38% lower than for the general population.157  In 
Alaska, the Jail Alternative Services Program significantly reduced ar-
rests and prison stays.158  In Clark County, Oregon, 54% of partici-
 
 150 Kondo, supra note 47, at 311 (citing Kim Barker, New Court Tries Prevention, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at B1). 
 151 See id. (citing Linda Wertheimer & Robert Siegel, Hour 2: Broward County, Flor-
ida’s Mental Health Court Helps Clear Out Some of the Jail Population by Dealing with the 
Mentally Ill Who’ve Committed Non-violent Misdemeanors (National Public Radio broad-
cast, Mar. 12, 1999)). 
 152 See Pub. L. No. 106-515, § 2, 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (lauding the “positive 
results” of King County); GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42 (examining four 
of the founding MHCs already in existence prior to April 2000: Broward County, 
Florida; King County, Washington; Anchorage, Alaska; and San Bernardino, Califor-
nia.  The King County MHC began operation in February 1999 and is thus one of the 
most established MHCs in the nation.). 
 153 NEISWENDER, supra note 105, at 6. 
 154 Id. at 4. 
 155 Id. at 7. 
 156 Castaneda, supra note 13 (noting recidivism rates were originally 56.3%, ac-
cording to MHC Judge Andrei Lee). 
 157 Bill Hughes, Mental Health Court Offers Options for Many Defendants, J. NEWS 
(Westchester County, N.Y.), April 14, 2004, at 6A. Judge Matthew D’Emic estimates 
that 50% of the general population violates probation, compared to only 12% of 
MHC clients.  Id. 
 158 Carns et al., supra note 114, at 29 (citing Christopher M. Hamilton & Steven L. 
Hamilton, Jail Alternative Service Program Evaluation 1, 8–14 (2000) (on file with 
the Alaska Judicial Council)).  Arrests averaged 3.4 per participant in the twelve 
months prior to the JAS program and 1.4 during the program.  Id.  Additionally, the 
program’s inception led to a reduction of the average jail stay from 30.2 days to 22.6 
days during the same period.  Id. 
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pants tracked were not rearrested within a year, total arrests among 
the group dropped 400%, and parole violations decreased 62%.159 
In Tennessee’s Metro Mental Health Court, after five years of 
operation, the recidivism rate is less than 10%.160  Additionally, a 
Washoe County, Nevada case study found a crime rate reduced from 
4.5 arrests per year, to only one arrest since enrolling.161  Since the 
court’s inception in 2001, jail and emergency services have been re-
duced by 85%.162  Clark County, Nevada has also seen dramatic re-
sults.  In the year prior to participation in MHC, the thirty-three cli-
ents amassed 3529 days in jail and were arrested 129 times.163  
However, since the court’s creation in December 2003, the clients 
have spent 777 days in jail following only forty-nine arrests.164  An-
other Nevada MHC, the Reno court, has also seen success.  There, in 
the year prior to MHC participation, forty participants averaged 528 
days in the hospital.165  But since completing the court-mandated 
program, the same forty individuals collectively spent ninety-three 
days in the hospital.166  In Clark County, Illinois, 85% of participants 
have not been arrested on new charges since participating in MHC.167  
St. Louis County Municipal MHC has dismissed the charges against 
95% of participants, following successful completion of prescribed 
treatment.168  Finally, 84% of people served by the Allegheny County, 
 
 159 Holley Gilbert, Mental Health Court Proves Its Value, OREGONIAN, June 29, 2004, 
at B1. 
 160 Burke, supra note 73. 
 161 Voyles, supra note 10.  Jail time fell from an average of fifty nights in jail in the 
year prior to enrollment to only twenty-two nights in jail after enrollment.  Id. 
 162 Zamna Avila, Judge Hands Out Praise—or Stern Warnings—in Courtroom, RENO 
GAZETTE-J., Oct. 28, 2005, at 1G.  Judge Peter Breen referred to his ability to help 
people resurrect their lives as “intoxicating.”  Id. 
 163 Whaley, supra note 146. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Nevada Legislators Urged to Fund Mental-Health Housing, MENTAL HEALTH WKLY. 
DIG., Mar. 14, 2005, at 10 (paraphrasing Harold Cook of the Reno MHC Mental 
Health Division). 
 166 Id.  Additionally, the same forty offenders were arrested a total of forty-five 
times in the year prior to court participation and since, they have been arrested eight 
times collectively.  Id. 
 167 Pessin, supra note 56, at 8.  Additionally, in the year prior to joining the pro-
gram, the average total of days spent in custody for the court’s twenty-six participants 
was 102.  Id.  After nine months in the program, however, the participants have aver-
aged six-and-a-half days per person in custody (and 60% of that time was served by 
just two offenders).  Id. 
 168 Barbour, supra note 147. 
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Pennsylvania, MHC have “stayed out of trouble with the law” while 
under the MHC’s supervision.169  And the list of successes goes on.170 
II. THE PROBLEM—MHCS ESTABLISHED AS PILOT PROGRAMS 
Since the 1997 birth of the nation’s first MHC in Broward 
County, many MHCs have been established as pilot programs, includ-
ing the “founding” MHCs in King County, San Bernardino, Califor-
nia,171 and Anchorage.172  The pilot model, however, relied upon in 
the MHC movement’s formative years has remained popular.173  Evi-
dencing this short-sighted perspective is New Jersey’s legislature, 
which considered four proposals in three legislative sessions for the 
establishment of a pilot MHC.174  By advocating pilot programs, poli-
cymakers in the Garden State and across America continue envision-
ing MHCs as experimental.175 
 
 169 Joe Fahy, Special Court Making Inroads Treating Mentally Ill Criminals, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 2005, at B-3.  According to a report by the Criminal Jus-
tice/Mental Health Consensus Project, the number of participants who had subse-
quent legal problems was “remarkably low.”  Id. 
 170 These impressive results continue to occur in other MHCs throughout the na-
tion.  See Brutzman, supra note 73 (In Greenville County, South Carolina, forty-three 
offenders participated in the MHC in its inaugural year of 2002.  In 2002, those indi-
viduals were arrested sixty-one times.  Since entering the program, those individuals 
accounted for only twenty-six arrests.); Jeff Coen, Mental Court Nets Stable Results; Only 
1 of 35 Guilty of New Felony in Year, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2005, at 3 (In Cook County’s 
MHC, thirty-five individuals were processed in its first calendar year.  Only one indi-
vidual was convicted of a new felony, a stark contrast considering that the same 
group of individuals averaged four arrests and two convictions each in the previous 
year and spent a total of 4000 days in custody.); Court Programs Save Lives and Money, 
OLYMPIAN (Olympia, Wash.), Oct. 3, 2005, at 7A (In Thurston County, Washington, 
the eighteen people participating in the six-month trial MHC had been previously 
booked 35 times.  Since entering the MHC, only two bookings have occurred for all 
eighteen). 
 171 GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 42 (discussing the creation of the na-
tion’s first MHCs). 
 172 See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 23. 
 173 See, e.g., Ken Kobayashi, Prisoners With Mental Problems Released For Care, 
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 19, 2005, at 31A (noting the early accomplishments of 
the state’s first MHC, which was part of a pilot program); Pessin, supra note 56, at 8 
(noting that the Cook County, Illinois, MHC is a pilot program) 
 174 Assemb. A1279, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (proposing a “Mental Health Court Pi-
lot Program” in Essex County); Assemb. A3867, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2003) (advocating 
for and appropriating $1.8 million to a “pilot program for mentally ill offenders”); 
Assemb. AR222, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (memorializing the judiciary to establish a 
MHC pilot program); Assemb. A2355, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (seeking to establish a 
“Mental Health Court Pilot Program”). 
 175 See Khurram Saeed, Jail Study Finds 16% Mentally Ill, J. NEWS (Westchester 
County, N.Y.), Oct. 8, 2004, at 1A.  Specifically, MHC advocates in Rockland County, 
New York, advocated for a pilot MHC for the past three years.  Id. 
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Despite the political palatability of pilot programs, this MHC es-
tablishment model has shortcomings, most notably inadequate fund-
ing.  “Predictably, the greatest barrier to establishment of state 
[MHCs] is in obtaining adequate political and financial support for 
such programs.  Ultimately, state legislators, policy-makers, and citi-
zens hold the purse strings to authorize and permit creation of these 
specialty courts.”176  This abstract assertion’s truth persists.  For exam-
ple, in Jackson County, Oregon, despite near unanimous support 
among county officials for an MHC, an obstacle remains: money.177 
Beyond the difficulties of raising adequate start-up funds, MHCs 
must sustain ample funding.  The anecdotal evidence depicting 
MHCs struggling to maintain sufficient funding abounds.178  A para-
mount cause of the growing pains confronting existing MHCs is un-
due reliance on grant funding.179  In the National Alliance of the 
Mentally Ill’s February 2005 Survey of Mental Health Courts,180 nearly 
78% of responding courts utilized grant funding,181 while 69% of 
those courts relied solely on grant money.182  This inordinate reliance 
on grants led the Superior Court of California, County of Placer to 
state that the “[s]cope of future operations [is] to be determined,”183 
which is strikingly similar to the language directed at two past Cali-
fornia MHCs that are no longer listed in the survey.184  The negative 
results stemming from dependence upon grant funding generated 
unflattering analogies such as comparing the federal government to 
 
 176 Kondo, supra note 47, at 302. 
 177 Lemon, supra note 11 (noting the comments of Jim Adams, Circuit Court ad-
ministrator for Jackson County, and Christine Herbert, a Medford criminal defense 
attorney); see also O’Neal, supra note 62.  This problem extends to various MHCs.  
According to Hamilton County General Sessions Court Judge Bob Moon, 
“[p]sychiatric defendants would most likely benefit from an exclusive mental health 
court, as would the general public. . . . However . . . it appears to me that tax dollar 
appropriations at this time or such a court is unlikely.”  Id. 
 178 See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 179 See Burke, supra note 73 (“It [the Metro MHC] barely survived a budget crunch 
this year after its federal grant expired.”). 
 180 SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8. 
 181 Id.  Fifty-four of the nation’s then existing 107 MHCs reported funding infor-
mation.  Id.  Forty-two MHCs relied to some extent on federal, state, and/or other 
grants for funding.  Id. 
 182 See id.  Twenty-nine courts reported only grants as a source of funding.  Id. 
 183 SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8. 
 184 Id.  The July 2004 survey indicated that “[f]uture funding [is] uncertain” for 
the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, which relied upon a 
Board of Corrections grant.  See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS JULY 2004, supra 
note 8, at 10. 
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heroin dealers who “give these grants to start these programs and 
they then take them away.”185 
In short, planners establishing pilot courts relying purely on 
grant money are incorrectly conceptualizing MHCs.  Such planners 
fail to recognize the challenges confronting existing MHCs and fail to 
adhere to the prevailing opinion that MHCs are no longer experi-
mental, but rather are permanent components of American justice.186  
“[L]awyers generally agree that specialized courts are here to stay.  
The alternative is for courts to be the dumping grounds for individu-
als with psychological problems.  The court system should acknowl-
edge this reality and gear for it.”187 
The institutionalization188 of MHCs continues, despite the fund-
ing crisis faced by this new breed of problem-solving courts.  Accord-
ing to Professor John Goldkamp, of Temple University: 
[W]hat we have now is not a bunch of little hobbies that judges 
have in isolated jurisdictions, but rather a paradigm shift that lar-
ger court systems are trying to come to grips with.  They’re at your 
door step.  The question isn’t: Gosh, are courts supposed to be 
doing this?  It’s: What are you going to do about it?  How does it 
fit in?  It’s no longer a question of whether this should have been 
invented.  They’re here.189 
Questions abound and solutions are needed.  How can MHCs 
garner community support from officials, the public, the media, and 
the legal community?  How can MHCs secure adequate financial sta-
bility?  How can MHCs ensure a sufficient employment pool to re-
plenish judges and court officials?  What types of infrastructure must 
MHCs implement to sustain growth, improve outcomes, and enhance 
the lives of mentally ill offenders and their communities? 
 
 185 Symposium, The Changing Face of Justice: The Evolution of Problem Solving, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1790, 1798 (2002) [hereinafter The Evolution of Problem Solving] 
(quoting comments of Judge Morris B. Hoffman, Denver District Court). 
 186 See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 14 (“Problem-
solving courts have achieved a kind of critical mass.  They are no longer just a set of 
isolated experiments driven by entrepreneurial judges and administrators”). 
 187 Davis, supra note 85, at 37 (continuing on to quote John Feinblatt of the Cen-
ter for Court Innovation, who said, “Problem-solving, focused courts ought to popu-
late the landscape more densely.”). 
 188 Institutionalization has been defined as a process by which individualized 
courts “evolve from separate experimental entities to a statewide network that is sta-
ble, far-reaching, reliably funded and closely monitored.”  FOX & WOLF, supra note 
99, at 3 (discussing the institutionalization of drug courts). 
 189 Berman, supra note 17, at 85 (comments of John Goldkamp). 
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III. THE SOLUTION 
Prospective action is needed from MHC advocates.  The pilot 
model of MHC establishment should be abandoned in favor of 
strategies providing the resources, funding, and infrastructure neces-
sary to maintain MHCs indefinitely.  Planners must increase commu-
nity support, secure long-term funding, provide for personnel replen-
ishment, and create adequate infrastructure to mitigate and rectify 
the “growing pains” of MHCs. 
A. Community Support 
Community support is critical in establishing MHCs.  “[W]e’ve 
learned that courts can’t carry out this problem-solving role alone.  
Collaborations with government agencies and community groups are 
essential.”190  But, the acquisition of broad community support re-
quires the articulation of a nuanced message to convince stake-
holders of the importance, necessity, and viability of MHCs.191 
Legislation is central to increase public support for MHCs, as 
court establishment requires political savvy.192  Such orchestration re-
quires maneuvering around “thorny political issues” including select-
ing an agency responsible for the courts, promoting MHCs despite 
alternative policy approaches, and convincing policymakers to con-
tinue funding during fiscal downturns.193  In short, state legislators 
must be convinced, since they control appropriations.194  Once poli-
cymakers are persuaded, the legislatures can enact three types of leg-
 
 190 Kaye, supra note 97, at 13 
 191 Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 9 (noting the successful “salesmanship” of 
drug court practioners by crafting a “nuanced message” that “appeals to a broad po-
litical spectrum”). 
 192 Cf. id at 10–11, 46 (discussing legislation’s role in the proliferation of drug 
courts). 
 193 See id. at 46. 
 194 See Kondo, supra note 47, at 302.  Persuasion of legislators will lead to MHC 
funding.  For example, Nevada Assemblyman William Horne introduced Assembly 
Bill 41 to provide $1 million per year for a MHC.  Whaley, supra note 146; see also Ne-
vada Legislators Urged to Fund Mental-Health Housing, supra note 165 (stating that the 
legislation sponsored by Assemblyman Horne will allocate $2 million to the Clark 
County MHC, in addition to providing funding for the Reno and newly established 
Carson City MHCs).  The great power state legislatures wield is also evident in Maine.  
There, the criminal justice community is closely watching the efficacy of the Kenne-
bec County MHC.  Judy Harrison, New Maine Court Under Way; System Seeks to Reduce 
Incarceration of People with Mental Illness, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at B1.  
Currently, the court is being funded by a three-year grant from the United States 
Department of Justice.  Id.  However, for MHC operations to continue after the grant 
money runs dry, the state legislature must fund the court.  Id. 
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islation supporting MHCs and problem-solving justice.195  First, the 
legislature can enact enabling legislation, which makes MHCs more 
politically palatable, attracts the legal community’s attention, and 
garners public support via awareness campaigns.196  Second, the legis-
lature can enact indirect legislation, or legislation that does not spe-
cifically mention MHCs nor their development.197  These legislative 
actions, such as resolutions creating task forces to examine mental 
health issues,198 are an effective, historical impetus for MHC estab-
lishment.199  Third, it can enact legislation requiring MHC establish-
ment.200  This coercive legislation, utilized in Texas to mandate prob-
lem-solving courts in seven, highly-populated, urban counties, is the 
most aggressive approach to court establishment.201 
While support from policymakers is essential in MHC establish-
ment, political approval will not coalesce without broad community 
support.202  “[A] prominent challenge within the mental health court 
system is to educate the public and to provide a common understand-
 
 195 FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 10–13. 
 196 Cf. id. at 10–11 (discussing enabling legislation in the drug court context).  An 
example of enabling legislation would be a legislatively approved study to determine 
the feasibility and beneficiality of MHC establishment.  Such a study, involving a re-
view of data related to mental health-related cases, has been proposed by Representa-
tive Jeannie McDaniel in the Oklahoma legislature.  Marie Price, Lawmaker Seeks Crea-
tion of Mental Health Court, TULSA WORLD, July 3, 2005, at A12. 
 197 Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 11–12 (discussing indirect legislation in the 
drug court context).  For example, Ohio has no legislation prescribing drug court 
operation, yet numerous laws support their process.  Id. 
 198 New Jersey may also utilize indirect legislation to create a MHC, as after four 
failed MHC pilot program proposals, the legislature is considering a bill that will cre-
ate a multi-disciplinary “Task Force to Improve the Treatment of Offenders with 
Mental Illness.”  Assemb. A2518, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) available at http://www. 
njleg.state.nj.us.  The Assembly unanimously approved the bill (79-0).  Id.  Though 
the Senate has yet to vote, the Senate Law and Public Safety and Veteran’s Affairs 
Committee reported favorably on the bill.  Sen. S1509, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). 
 199 Task force creation, a possibility that may arise through indirect legislation, has 
historically been a catalyst for MHC creation.  The nation’s first MHC in Broward 
County was the product of a task force, Lerner-Wren, supra note 106, at 2, as was the 
King County MHC.  Watson et al., supra note 50, at 479 (citing James D. Cayce & 
Kare Burrell, King County’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach for Coordinating 
Justice Services, WASH. STATE B. NEWS, June 1999, at 19–23). 
 200 Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 12–13 (discussing coercive legislation in the 
drug court context). 
 201 Id. at 12. 
 202 See The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, supra note 48, at 1760–61 (statement of 
Harlem Community Court’s Rolando Acosta) (“[T]he planning team [of the prob-
lem-solving Harlem Justice Center] understood that the success of the Justice Center 
was going to be largely dependent upon the full support of the community in which 
the Center would be located.  The community itself had to buy into the innovative 
community-based approach of dispensing justice.”). 
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ing of the benefits and the costs of the program . . . .”203  Positively, 
mobilizing community support may not be difficult, as a 2001 Na-
tional Center for State Courts survey found strong support already ex-
isting for common problem-solving strategies.204  A “solid majority of 
the public” supports the methods of problem-solving justice.205  This 
sponsorship is particularly passionate among minority groups, as over 
80% of African-Americans and Latinos support hiring counselors and 
social workers.206  Additionally, support extends beyond minority 
groups and includes various organizations concerned with the men-
tally ill’s plight, such as the Council of State Governments,207 the 
American Jail Association, the American Correctional Association, 
the American Sheriff’s Association, and the National Mental Health 
Association, all of which endorse MHC establishment.208 
Despite this support, the community’s endorsement can never 
be too strong.  Thus, a communications strategy must be constructed 
to “spread the gospel” of MHCs and problem-solving justice.209  Plan-
ners and advocates can employ various techniques, including direct 
pubic communication and media utilization.  Additionally, planners 
should encourage judges to publicly advocate for MHC establishment 
and maintenance. 
Direct communication campaigns can occur in various manners, 
all of which will be implemented by proficient MHC advocates.  At 
the most democratic level, MHC advocates should conduct town 
meetings where MHCs’ values are espoused, public questions are an-
swered, and invaluable community input is received.210  This intimate 
interaction leads to a more symbiotic and efficient court/community 
 
 203 Keele, supra note 36, at 203. 
 204 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 6.  The survey found support for the hiring of 
treatment staff and social workers, offenders reporting back to court on their treat-
ment progress, coordinated work among local agencies to treat offenders, and utiliz-
ing relevant experts to assist courts in decision-making.  Id. 
 205 DAVID B. ROTTMAN & RANDALL M. HANSEN, HOW RECENT COURT USERS VIEW THE 
STATE COURTS: PERCEPTIONS OF WHITES, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND LATINOS 3 (1999), 
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_RecentCt 
UsersViewPTCPub.pdf. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Skeem & Petrila, supra note 120, at 8.  The Council of State Government rec-
ognized MHCs as a “workable” option for communities with limited resources.  
CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 46, at 6. 
 208 Kondo, supra note 47, at 309 (citing DeWine, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASE, 
supra note 68, at 2). 
 209 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 5. 
 210 See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 21. 
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relationship,211 which, in turn, allows partnerships to forge, increases 
community involvement, and creates a more responsive court.212  Ad-
ditionally, Internet communication provides an efficient, cost-
effective, and practical communications medium.213  Notably, the 
King County MHC website publishes a fact sheet, task force recom-
mendations, media coverage, downloadable court forms, frequently 
asked questions, statistics, and mental health resource links.214 
Another strategy for increasing public support is the controlled 
use of media attention.215  To increase public support, MHCs should 
capitalize upon free ink by exploiting media avenues, including creat-
ing public service announcements, encouraging op-ed submissions, 
and conducting public events designed, in part, to attract media cov-
erage.216  Such strategies are effectively implemented by numerous 
problem-solving courts (e.g., National Public Radio and Good Morn-
 
 211 See id.  Judge John Leventhal, of the Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, hosts 
monthly meetings in the courthouse.  Id.  Attendees include prosecutors, defenders, 
victim advocates, batterers-intervention programs, service providers, religious lead-
ers, and community activists.  Id.  The meetings led to new protocols that allowed the 
court to improve efficacy.  Id. 
 212 See Randal B. Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor Mental Health Court Incorporates 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative Justice, in MANAGEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION 
at 17 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003). 
 213 Kondo, supra note 47, at 315 (arguing for increased on-line interaction among 
MHC advocates, which would permit “mutual communication and sharing of ‘best 
court practices’”).  Notably, as of February 2005 at least forty-four MHCs had operat-
ing websites devoted to the problem-solving court.  See SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH 
COURTS FEBRUARY 2005, supra note 8. 
 214 Kondo, supra note 47, at 315; see also Mental Health Court Home Page, King 
County District Court,  http://www.metrokc.gov/kcdc/mhindex.htm (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2006). 
 215 This strategy has been employed by MHC’s role model, drug courts.  However, 
the success of drug courts in attracting positive media attention has been too great, 
as drug court success stories are often no longer newsworthy. FOX & WOLF, supra note 
99, at 9. 
[D]rug courts have been successful at attracting press coverage of drug 
court graduations—in some cases, so successful that they can’t get local 
newspapers to cover them any more.  For example, the local press in 
Boone County, Missouri, had covered so many graduations that report-
ers were beginning to balk at going.  “Once the governor came and our 
daily newspaper did not show up,” said Judge Christine Carpenter.  
Their response was, “This isn’t news, you’re just using us for good PR,” 
Carpenter said. 
Id.  Controlled use of the media can also lead to political pressure, as seen in upstate 
New York where The Times Union called upon Governor George Pataki and the state 
legislature to support the creation of more mental health courts.  When the Accused are 
Ill, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), June 19, 2005, at E4. 
 216 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 5; see also Dale Hall, Twenty-One Monroe County Men-
tal Health Court Graduates Honored, DAILY REC. OF ROCHESTER, Oct. 31, 2005. 
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ing America have featured the nation’s trailblazing MHC, Broward 
County).217  Additionally, Judge Kaye called for the establishment of 
more “hands-on” courts in a widely cited218 Newsweek commentary.219 
Further, MHC stakeholders, especially judges, must be public 
advocates.220  By advocating MHCs through speeches and community 
engagements, judges accomplish numerous goals, including: increas-
ing comprehension of social contexts; building effective community 
partnerships; and improving public trust, confidence, and opinions 
of MHCs.221  From their “bully pulpit,”222 judges can effectively and 
significantly impact public attitudes and encourage problem-solving 
justice.223  A judicial willingness to publicly advocate highlights MHCs’ 
benefits, making these courts a public and political priority.224  Such 
advocacy was recently seen in Idaho, where two MHC judges briefed 
the state’s Senate Health and Welfare Committee on the importance 
of problem-solving courts, including MHCs.225  The senate subse-
quently passed three bills aimed at expanding MHCs within the state 
and raising additional funds.226  All three bills passed unanimously.227 
Additionally, an active judiciary will impact other communica-
tions strategies.  For example, a vocally active judiciary can garner 
positive media coverage, as MHC judges are visible advocates possess-
ing unique and newsworthy opportunities to convey the need for 
MHCs.228  Further, a politically savvy bench can pressure legislators 
and other policymakers to support MHCs.  For example, Richard 
Guy, Chief Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court, encour-
aged voters to write their elected representatives expressing opinions 
 
 217 Lerner-Wren, supra note 106, at 4. 
 218 The article has been cited by at least 13 American law review and law journal 
articles. 
 219 Kaye, supra note 97, at 13. 
 220 Rottman, supra note 95, at 23–24 (“The expertise of a specialized judge in a 
particular subject matter helps the court secure community-wide support for the 
court’s programs.”). 
 221 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 19. 
 222 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4. 
 223 Id.; cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 46 (discussing the impact of judicial 
speeches, interviews, and media coverage in the drug court context). 
 224 Cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 45 (discussing judges actively advocating for 
drug courts). 
 225 Wright, supra note 146. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Kondo, supra note 47, at 314.  For a further example of MHC judges utilizing 
the media to advance the policy goals of MHCs, see Dodson, supra note 148. 
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on the judiciary’s future.229  Such a grassroots effort could effectively 
motivate policy-makers. 
A final strategy for garnering additional support for MHCs is an 
appeal to the legal community.  Richard E. Redding, an associate 
professor of law at Villanova University, proposed a novel method.230  
Professor Redding encouraged requiring law student exposure to 
“mental illness, how to represent mentally ill clients, adjudicative 
competence, the mental health needs of various offender groups and 
how these unmet needs may contribute to criminal behavior . . . .”231  
Some law schools have exposed their students to therapeutic juris-
prudence through classroom presentations.232  But, outreach to the 
bar can extend beyond the classroom’s Socratic method, to bar asso-
ciations and continuing legal education seminars.233  For example, 
Fordham University School of Law raised awareness among legal 
practitioners by hosting numerous symposiums concerning mental 
 
 229 Kondo, supra note 47, at 316 (citing Chief Justice Richard P. Guy, Justice Denied 
in Washington’s Clogged Courts: Supreme Court Justice Sees Resources Lagging Far Behind, 
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan 23, 2000, at B8). 
 230 See Redding, supra note 75. 
     Forensic mental health issues should be an integral part of the 
criminal law curriculum, beginning with the first-year criminal law 
course.  This Article presents recommendations for teaching mental 
health issues in first-year criminal law, presents empirical data indicat-
ing that first-year students have mixed,though generally positive, reac-
tions to incorporating such non-traditional content into the course, 
and provides a syllabus for an upper-level course in criminal law and 
psychology.  Incorporating mental health topics into the traditional 
criminal law curriculum is part of the ongoing trend in legal education 
towards expanding pedagogy beyond legal doctrine into relevant social 
science disciplines that can inform legal policy and students’ under-
standing of the criminal justice system, perhaps more so than many of 
the doctrinal lessons we now teach. 
Id. at 407–08. 
 231 Id. at 407. 
 232 Gregory Baker & Jennifer Zawid, The Birth of a Therapeutic Courts Externship Pro-
gram: Hard Labor but Worth the Effort, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 728 (2005) (discuss-
ing classroom presentations made by attorneys practicing in MHCs). 
 233 See BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4 (discussing education and training initiatives 
for judges, clerks, attorneys, court officers, and court administrators).  Appropriate 
examples of such efforts are the Council of State Governments June 2005 conference 
titled “Mental Health Courts and Beyond: Improving the Response to People with 
Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System,”  Bureau of Justice Assistance Mental 
Health Court Program, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/discussion/ 
thread-c?msg_id=00002a (last visited Feb. 15, 2006), and the Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance’s “Mental Health Courts Program Newsletter.”  Bureau of Justice Assistance 
Mental Health Court Program, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/MHCP-
April-newsletter.adp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
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illness, MHCs, and problem-solving courts.234  These efforts already 
encountered success, as the legal profession embraces MHCs. The 
Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators,235 and all fifty state court chief judges (with all fifty state court 
administrators) support problem-solving justice and MHCs.236  Addi-
tionally, the University of Maryland Survey Research Center found 
that the judiciary endorses problem-solving tools, with approximately 
90% of respondents believing the judiciary should address social 
problems such as mental illness and that treatment is more effective 
than incarceration.237  These innovative approaches to legal education 
will increase the bar’s awareness of mental illness, the problems it 
creates, and available solutions. 
B. Adequate Funding 
Public support for MHCs is a means to an end: money.  MHCs 
need money to be established, to operate, and to sustain growth.  Un-
fortunately, MHCs generally require more funding than traditional 
courts due to the additional costs of corresponding community 
health treatment.238  These costs could be harmful, as “[t]he (usually) 
 
 234 See, e.g., The Birth of a Problem Solving Court, supra note 48; The Evolution of Prob-
lem Solving, supra note 185. 
 235 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 39, at 14.  The Conference 
of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators passed a joint resolu-
tion pledging to “encourage the broad integration . . . of the principles and methods 
employed in problem solving courts into the administration of justice.”  Id. 
 236 Aubrey Fox & Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A Conversation About the Future of 
Drug Courts, 39 CT. REV. 4, 10 (2002) (according to Kevin Burke, Chief Judge of 
Hennepin County, Minnesota, “[t]he fact of the matter is that the Conference of 
Chief Justices is a pretty conservative group.  This may be the first time they’ve passed 
an endorsement that is pro-active in nature, and it has been a great help in getting 
people's attention.”). 
 237 Berman & Feinblatt. A Quiet Revolution, supra note 93, at 213 (highlighting a 
research study surveying over five hundred criminal court judges). 
 238 See Keele, supra note 36, at 203.  Keele states: 
As in every new political venture, the majority of the pubic is con-
cerned with funding and long-term financial support.  The mental 
health court system uniquely requires financial support at the court 
level, as well as within the community treatment arena for a compre-
hensive and successful program to be administered.  Therefore, a 
prominent challenge within the mental health court system is to edu-
cate the public and to provide a common understanding of the bene-
fits and the costs of the program to those who implement public policy 
and provide funding to justice programs. 
Id.; see also Fahy, supra note 169.  According to Christy Visher, a principal researcher 
associated at the Urban Institute in Washington, MHCs generally cost more to oper-
ate than traditional courts, due to the length of hearings and numerous court ap-
pearances by offenders.  Id. 
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higher costs associated with specialized courts may prove fatal during 
an economic downturn.”239  Since funding is the major concern when 
establishing MHCs, a variety of adequate funding streams must be en-
trenched to sustain indefinite viability. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that MHCs cannot rely solely on 
grants.  Currently, MHCs in eight states face severe budgetary con-
straints, mostly due to over-reliance upon grant money,240 while courts 
in the formative stages continue to wander down the same dangerous 
path.241  Rather than exist at the mercy of grants, revocable in any fis-
cal year, MHCs need permanent funding sources.242  Creative and in-
novative fund-raising is required.  Morris Hoffman, of the Denver 
Drug Court’s fund-raising efforts, said, “[w]e have tried to do creative 
things with our general funding.”  Morris Hoffman continued, “I told 
everybody the other day that we need Arthur Andersen to come in 
and set up some offshore limited partnerships.”243  MHC advocates 
and planners must adopt and integrate strategies, choosing from a 
plethora of effective fund-raising approaches already implemented by 
courts nationwide. 
The first strategy MHC planners should adopt is to create multi-
ple funding streams.244  By diversifying revenue sources,245 MHCs will 
not detrimentally rely on any single mechanism, thereby increasing 
the court’s financial stability.  Second, MHCs can implement a nomi-
nal surcharge to participants.246  For example, the Wellness Court in 
 
 239 Rottman, supra note 95, at 24.  It is also important to note that problem-solving 
courts in general, and specifically MHCs, “proliferated in an era of particularly gen-
erous funding,” due in large part to a robust economy.  Id. 
 240 See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text. 
 241 Two Greenville County, South Carolina Probate Court Judges, Ted Sauvain 
and Debra Faulkner, are spearheading a drive to create a MHC.  Brutzman, supra 
note 73.  In anticipation of a $150,000 operating budget, Judges Sauvain and Faulk-
ner applied for a $110,000 grant (equal to over 73% of the operating budget) from 
the state’s Department of Public Safety.  Id. 
 242 See Voyles, supra note 10. 
 243 The Evolution of Problem Solving, supra note 185, at 1798. 
 244 Cf. id. at 1808 (discussing funding for drug courts).  Multiple funding streams 
are critical.  Marilyn Robers of the Department of Justice said: “I want to emphasize 
reallocation of resources, I want to emphasize multiple funding streams, because 
drug courts cannot exist on a federal grant.  They cannot exist on any one funding 
stream.  There are multiple resources that have to be brought to bear to make a drug 
court work. ” Id. 
 245 Clark County, Nevada is a prime example of fund diversification.  Juliet V. Ca-
sey, Court Wins Its Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 13, 2005, at 1B.  During its first year of 
operation, the court relied upon a federal grant of $150,000.  Id.  However, thanks to 
new appropriations by the state legislature, the MHC will receive approximately two 
million dollars in the next biennium.  Id. 
 246 See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 18–19. 
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Alaska, a problem-solving court that treats alcohol-addicted offend-
ers,247 emphasizes participants’ economic self-sufficiency and, there-
fore, requires participants to contribute towards monitoring and 
treatment costs.248  This strategy may soon be adopted in Idaho, as 
legislation passed the Senate, 35-0, requiring offenders admitted into 
the MHC to pay $300 per month to participate.249 
Third, MHCs can raise revenue through court instituted sur-
charges or fines.  Several MHCs utilize this strategy.  Nevada courts 
implemented this strategy, as the Reno pilot MHC employs a five dol-
lar surcharge on local misdemeanor fines,250 while the Washoe 
County MHC requires a fifteen dollar fee of all convicted misde-
meanor offenders.251  The Board in Cook County, Illinois, in an effort 
to generate an estimated $300,000 per year and decrease reliance on 
grant money by creating a more permanent funding stream, ap-
proved a ten-dollar fee to be charged to all defendants found guilty of 
felonies or misdemeanors in the county’s circuit court.252  Whereas a 
nominal fine imposed upon criminal offenders is unlikely to spark 
public outrage, the fourth strategy for MHC fund-raising is the least 
politically palatable: a tax increase.253  However, the tax surcharge has 
been explored by some MHCs, specifically in Fairfield County, 
Ohio,254 Jackson County, Oregon,255 and Dane County, Wisconsin.256  A 
 
 247 Id. at 29. 
 248 Id. at 18–19.  Wellness Court participants may be required to pay for their elec-
tronic monitoring program which costs up to fifteen dollars per day and the cost of 
certain medications which may cost $150 per month.  Id. 
 249 Wright, supra note 146.  The MHC, however, would have the power to exempt 
offenders from the fee under certain circumstances.  Id. 
 250 Nowlen, supra note 9. 
 251 Voyles, supra note 10. 
 252 Mickey Ciokajlo, Mental Health Court fee OKd, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2005, Metro, at 
3; Pessin, supra note 56, at 8.  See also Lisa Smith, Mental Health Court in the Works, CHI. 
D. HERALD, Jan. 6, 2006, at 3 (discussing a ten dollar fee, earmarked to support the 
creation of a MHC in Kane County, Illinois, to be paid by all defendants found guilty 
or granted court supervision); Editorial, A Court of First Resort, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2005, at C12 (discussing the creation of a MHC in St. Clair 
County, Missouri, which shall be funded by a $10 fee charged to people convicted of 
felonies and misdemeanors in the county). 
 253 Tim Kelly, Editorial, Use Prop. 63 Funds to Create Juvenile Court of Second Chances, 
SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (San Gabriel, Cal.), Dec. 23, 2004 (calling for the use of tax 
funds to finance the creation of a juvenile mental health court). 
 254 Mary Beth Lane, Fairfield County Plans to Add Mental-Health Court Next Year, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Oct. 27, 2004, at 5B.  Planners hope to util-
ize money from a county Alcohol Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services levy, 
placed on the November 2, 2004 ballot.  Id. 
 255 Lemon, supra note 11.  According to Jim Adams, Circuit Court Administrator 
for Jackson County, the state court system cannot maintain existing programs with-
out a tax surcharge.  Id. 
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tax should be the last resort, as tax increases will detrimentally impact 
public support. 
Other strategies to ensure adequate funding are not revenue-
raising initiatives, but cost-reducing enterprises.  MHCs should seek 
the gratuitous service of judges, attorneys, and other MHC stake-
holders.257  While such an endeavor may conflict with ensuring ade-
quate personnel and would be unrealistic on a broad scope, voluntary 
services could help reduce MHC expenditures.258  For example, col-
lege, pre-med, and law students could assist MHCs in exchange for 
academic credit.  The Anchorage MHC utilizes interns from the Uni-
versity of Alaska-Anchorage for staff support,259 and the Broward 
County MHC allows doctoral students from Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity, under the supervision of the public defender’s mental health 
staff, to screen clients for program participation.260 
Further, MHCs are long-term cost savers.261  The MHCs’ effec-
tiveness262 will reduce recidivism, reduce unnecessary incarceration, 
and more appropriately allocate expensive correctional facility 
 
 256 Nowlen, supra note 9.  Dane County Executive Kathleen Falk believes a tax-
funded MHC may be justified.  Id. 
 257 See Shoaf, supra note 31, at 978 (noting the Akron MHC’s use of reassignment 
of and expansion of job duties to obtain adequate resources for the court); see also 
Carns et al., supra note 114, at 17. 
Even the projects that have functioned for some period of time without 
outside funding have managed only by using substantial time volun-
teered by judges, attorneys and other persons and organizations in the 
community . . . . [T]he judges, treatment providers and attorneys in-
volved in these projects contributed all of the time needed to plan and 
bring the courts into operation. 
Id. at 17–18.  Voluntary services were used effectively in Kennebec County, Maine, 
where a judge, prosecutor, case manager, crisis counselor, and numerous others vol-
unteered their time to launch the county’s MHC.  Harrison, supra note 194. 
 258 Libby Sander, Mental Health Court Thriving: Prosecutor, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 
19, 2004, at 3.  The DuPage County Mental Health Court originally operated solely 
on the gratuitous efforts of prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement officials, 
probation officers, and mental health staff.  Id. 
 259 Carns et al., supra note 114, at 17. 
 260 Petrila et al., supra note 54, at 18. 
 261 MHCs may even be short-term cost savers.  For example, in Oklahoma County, 
the cost per day to incarcerate a mentally ill offender is $175, while the community 
mental health treatment required for an MHC participant is only $20 per day.  Jeff 
Packham, Advocates Sing Praises of Oklahoma’s Mental Health Courts, J. REC. (Oklahoma 
City, Okla.), Oct. 5, 2005.  Similar results exist in Ada County, Idaho, where the cost 
per person for the MHC is approximately one-third of the cost of housing a defen-
dant in the penitentiary or county jail.  McLaughlin, supra note 147. 
 262 See supra notes 147–69 and accompanying text. 
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beds.263  Public funds allocated today by state and federal legislators to 
fund permanent MHCs “will be repaid many times over through 
lower public costs” via “reductions in expensive long term health 
care, diminished need for welfare benefits, and less costly judicial 
processes,” as well as increases in “educational achievement, em-
ployment opportunities, improved development of communities and 
the enhancement of family life.”264  Thus, while in the short term, 
permanent MHCs may require significant funding, their long-term 
benefits will more than cover the initial sticker-shock. 
C. Personnel 
In addition to cultivating community support and ensuring con-
tinued financial viability, MHC planners must ensure a constant 
source of personnel, most importantly judges.  Advocates must adopt 
strategies and replenishment mechanisms to ensure long-term staff-
ing, which are most critical when looking at the bench.  MHCs con-
front a quandary in depending upon a particular judge (usually the 
judge who spearheaded the court’s founding).  Thus, upon the 
judge’s retirement, death, or term expiration, MHCs face succession 
problems.265 
MHCs present a unique judicial appointment problem, as judges 
are disinclined to preside over these new problem-solving courts.  For 
many judges, problem-solving court assignments are undesirable, in-
jected with high risks and low benefits.266  From a professional per-
spective, current and prospective judges view problem-solving court 
appointments as less prestigious, with fewer career advancement op-
portunities.267  From an institutional perspective, judges are reluctant 
to embrace MHCs’ deviations from the precedential orientation of 
traditional jurisprudence.268 
 
 263 See Patrick Geary, Note, Juvenile Mental Health Courts and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: Facing the Challenges Posed by Youth with Mental Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice Sys-
tem, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 671, 705 (2005) (discussing the cost-saving 
nature of juvenile MHCs). 
 264 Gail B. Nayowith, A Window of Opportunity for Children Who Stay Too Long, in 
CHILDREN'S LAW INSTITUTE 2000, 383 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Series, Criminal 
Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Series No. C-185, 2000) (discussing cost-
benefits in juvenile context); see also Geary, supra note 263, at 705 (discussing cost-
saving nature of juvenile MHCs). 
 265 Rottman, supra note 95, at 24. 
 266 Cf. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 9 (referencing the negatives 
associated with a specialized domestic violence court). 
 267 Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 16. 
 268 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 9–10.  MHCs are novel and 
comparatively unknown when juxtaposed with the precedent and traditions of tradi-
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These drawbacks, however, are surmountable, as MHC planners, 
advocates, and administrators have ample carrots to dangle before 
judges to encourage MHC participation.  The most attractive entice-
ment is the overwhelming professional satisfaction that problem-
solving judges experience, as opposed to their traditional court 
peers.269  Such satisfaction was evidenced in MHCs’ older brother, 
drug courts.  For example, Judge Truman Morrison discussed a sen-
ior, stereotypical “traditional judge” who confided that the “single 
most meaningful experience” in over two decades on the bench was 
twelve months serving on a drug court.270  But the anecdotal proof ex-
tends from the courtroom to the family room.  A recent study by 
Deborah Chase and Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction,271 “stemmed from two judges . . . 
who discovered their own alcoholism” after drug court appointment, 
as well as the author’s increased happiness due to her assignment to a 
problem-solving court.272  In addition to finding increased profes-
sional pride and a “brighter outlook,” the study found drug court 
judges and officials stopped smoking, drinking alcohol, realized their 
own addictions, lost weight, and exercised more.273 
Chase and Fulton Hora’s study presents compelling statistical 
evidence corroborating the anecdote of increased judicial satisfaction 
for problem-solving jurists.  First, drug court officials have signifi-
cantly more appreciation for the court’s role than their traditional 
counterparts, as drug court officers were more likely to sense that the 
court aided litigants and made “significant improvements in [liti-
 
tional jurisprudence.  Id.  Thus, the informal, future-oriented, and innovative MHC 
structure appears foreign to judges trained as neutral arbiters focused on procedures 
and penalties.  Id.  According to some, such as the District of Columbia Superior 
Court’s Judge Tony Morrison III, the round peg of social change may not be a good 
institutional fit in the square hole of American jurisprudence.  Id.; see also Munetz & 
Teller, supra note 40, at 949 (discussing the Akron Municipal Court’s three-year his-
tory and noting that the first MHC team was “uncomfortable with non-traditional 
methods of case management”). 
 269 Cf. Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence for Judicial Satisfaction, 37 CT. REV. 12 (Spring 2000) (informally surveying 
194 judicial officers and 123 non-judicial officers from both drug treatment courts 
and family law courts). 
 270 BERMAN & FEINBLATT, JUDGES, supra note 88, at 23. 
 271 Chase & Fulton Hora, supra note 269, at 12. 
 272 Id. at 13. (“Personal observation makes it clear that the drug treatment court 
not only can have a therapeutic effect on the recovering participant but also on the 
other criminal justice players in the courtroom as well.”). 
 273 Id. 
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gants’] lives.”274  Similar results were evident in officials’ attitudes to-
wards litigants, as drug court officials felt respected by court partici-
pants,275 while also witnessing increased gratefulness among liti-
gants.276  These positive effects altered personal lives, as more drug 
court officials enjoyed discussing their work, were professionally satis-
fied, and were less likely to desire transfers than their family court 
colleagues.277  Ultimately, 91% of drug court respondents felt their as-
signment “affected them in a positive way emotionally.”278  In conclu-
sion, the study found that “the enthusiasm of drug treatment court 
professionals for their work is not only infectious but is almost un-
heard of in a profession which experiences a high degree of ‘burn-
out’ and job dissatisfaction.”279 
However, planners and advocates cannot rely solely on the in-
tangible benefits of problem-solving justice to recruit competent ju-
rists.  Tangible incentives must exist.  Therefore, MHC judges should 
be eligible for salary increases, future promotions, travel opportuni-
ties, and prime office space.280  Tangible enticements can counteract 
the potential pitfalls of judicial assignments to novel courts.  Further, 
MHC advocates should encourage and create avenues for public rec-
ognition of MHC judges.281  Such public acknowledgment will serve 
both as an enticement to jurists to participate in MHCs and as a tool 
to increase community awareness. 
While a pipeline supplying judges to MHCs is important, so is a 
pipeline for all players on the MHC stage, no matter how small the 
 
 274 Id. at 15.  In all, 92% of drug treatment court judicial officers saw improvement 
in the defendants appearing before them.  Id.; see also Jennifer Batchelor, Mental 
Health Court Offers Alternative to Criminal Defendants, DEL. L. WEEKLY, Dec. 15, 2004, at 
D1. 
“I have been very impressed by the positive feedback that I have gotten 
from participants,” [Judge Joseph F.] Flickering [III] said.  According 
to the judge, numerous offenders have said that the Mental Health 
Court made a “dramatic difference” in their lives.  “There is a notice-
able difference even to a layperson as to their outlook on life, their atti-
tude, their self-confidence [and] their increased ability to . . . deal with 
their issues on a daily basis.  It's significant.” 
Id. 
 275 Chase & Fulton Hora, supra note 269, at 16. Of the participants in the drug 
treatment group, 92%  reported feeling respected by litigants, compared to only 72% 
of the family law court group.  Id. 
 276 Id.  The drug treatment group perceived litigants as grateful 81% of the time, 
compared to 33% of the time reported by the family law court group.  Id. 
 277 Id. at 16–17. 
 278 Id. at 17. 
 279 Id. at 18. 
 280 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4–5. 
 281 Id.; see also Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 17. 
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part.  As such, all court officials and law enforcement personnel 
should be provided with appropriate training to ensure continued 
staff replenishment.282  Training is critical, as it will accustom stake-
holders with MHC practices, promote MHC goals, and ensure succes-
sion in various MHC positions.  Currently, however, training is inade-
quate.283  “[T]he problem is that there isn’t enough education or 
training of the lawyers who are working in these courts about how to 
do it a little bit differently . . . .”284  But, inept training extends beyond 
legal education, as, for example, law enforcement personnel in 84% 
of the nation’s jails have less than three hours training on mental ill-
ness.285  Therefore, advocates must increase stakeholder training. 
Numerous strategies exist for increased training.  The simplest 
strategy is to provide stakeholders with educational programs, sympo-
siums, lectures, and other similar events to increase MHC stakeholder 
interaction and disseminate information.286  Second, at the state level, 
clearinghouse creation will facilitate the transfer of practical knowl-
edge.287  Third, law enforcement entities can adopt intervention 
strategies.288  The most well known example is the Crisis Intervention 
Team of Memphis, Tennessee.289  The program provides forty hours 
of voluntary training in psychiatric and substance use disorders to po-
lice officers.290  Fourth, the cost-saving use of legal interns291 will pro-
 
 282 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4; Kondo, supra note 47, at 284–85 (calling 
for judicial expertise); Winick, supra note 32, at 1066, 1069 (calling for judicial ex-
pertise); Winick, supra note 115, at 127 (calling for increased training of police offi-
cers).  Judges should also be included in training programs because, as Dee Kifowit, 
director of the Texas Council on Offenders with Mental Impairments suggests, “A lot 
of judges have no clue about mental illness.” Andrew Tilghman, A More Sensitive Sys-
tem: Justice for the Mentally Ill; County Judges Consider a Court Where Offenders with Medical 
Conditions Get Specialized Treatment, HOUSTON CHRON., February 8, 2005, at B1. 
 283 Wolff, supra note 65, at 144 (noting that most jail staffs receive less than three 
hours of training on issues concerning mental illness). 
 284 Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 92, at 212 (quoting Judge Harris Kluger, Ad-
ministrative Judge, New York City Criminal Court). 
 285 Kondo, supra note 47, at 309. 
 286 See Rottman & Casey, supra note 125, at 17. 
 287 Id. 
 288 See Lamberti, supra note 43, at 33. 
 289 Id.  Other similar programs include the Psychiatric Emergency Response Team 
in San Diego, California, and the Community Service Officer Unit in Birmingham, 
Alabama.  Id. 
 290 Id.  The voluntary program includes the study of crisis de-escalation tech-
niques.  Id. 
 291 See Baker & Zawid, supra note 232, at 730–34.  The University of Miami is cur-
rently exploring a therapeutic court externship in conjunction with the Broward 
County MHC.  Id.; see also, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:21-3(b) (providing for the appearance of 
third year law students and graduates of American Bar Association-approved schools 
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vide training and cultivate future stakeholders.292  By encouraging in-
ternship opportunities,293 symbiotic relationships can be formed, 
where students gain experiential education and MHCs receive inex-
pensive labor. 
D. Infrastructure 
In addition to creating an infrastructure providing for the in-
definite replenishment of MHC personnel, planners must increase 
MHC research.  Reliable data can be compiled by creating informa-
tion management systems (IMS) which will provide invaluable statis-
tics and permit MHCs to improve their practice through heightened 
accountability and transparency.294 
Current MHC research has been highly criticized, as advocates 
and critics recognize the overall lack of empirical and credible evi-
dence supporting MHCs.295  One vocal critic stated: “[T]here is no re-
liable data, in my view, that [problem-solving courts] accomplish any-
thing other than making judges feel warm and fuzzy . . . .”296  Such 
criticisms have sparked an equally loud clamor for increased re-
search.297  However, the financial support for such empirical research 
 
before a trial court or agency in accordance with programs approved by the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court). 
 292 See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
 293 See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text. 
 294 See Shoaf, supra note 31, at 975.  While IMS is a recommended mechanism for 
compiling information, MHC planners should be willing to think creatively and util-
ize numerous forms of research.  Id.  For example, the Ohio Office of Criminal Jus-
tice Services funded a project to address the court’s impact on recidivism and other 
criminal justice measures.  Id.  These moneys led to a case study of the Akron Mental 
Health Court, authored by Lisa Shoaf.  Id.  Such studies, regardless of scale, can pro-
vide MHC planners and advocates valuable information regarding the experiences of 
other MHCs and provide strategies to avoid past mistakes.  Id. 
 295 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 32, at 1062.  “These programs appear to be success-
ful, although the empirical research on their efficacy remains preliminary and often 
methodologically flawed.”  STEVEN BELENKO, NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBS-
TANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 
UPDATE 26–33 (2001); Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just the (Unwieldy, Hard to Gather 
But Nonetheless Essential) Facts, Ma’am: What We Know and Don’t Now About Problem-
Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1036 (2003); Keele, supra note 36, at 199 
(“To date, there has been very little empirical data collected regarding the effective-
ness of the current mental health court system.”). 
 296 The Evolution of Problem Solving, supra note 185, at 1795 (quoting Morris Hoff-
man).  This position, however, is extreme, as numerous studies have recognized the 
success of the founding problem-solving courts (i.e., drug courts) in reducing recidi-
vism. See, e.g., Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1030–35 (citing BELENKO, supra 
note 295, at 26–33) (acknowledging that drug courts result in higher retention rates, 
improve outcomes, and reduce recidivism). 
 297 See Carns et al., supra note 114, at 54. 
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lags.298  The Marion County, Indiana, Psychiatric Assertive Identifica-
tion Referral/Response Program is a fitting example as, despite a 
long history, the program has no statistics on recidivism due to insuf-
ficient funds.299 
At the core of MHCs is a reliance on information to recognize 
problems, improve operations, increase accountability, and verify 
outcomes.300  Thus, MHCs need information to survive, but “[i]t takes 
time and money to track recidivism over the long term, to meaning-
fully weigh program costs and benefits, and to compare new practices 
to one another, as well as business as usual.”301  Therefore, rather than 
relying on research to be conducted and funded after MHC estab-
lishment, such research should be integrated into the court’s infra-
structure.  The mechanism: Information Management Systems.302 
Louisiana drug courts have already adopted and implemented 
IMS statewide,303 and a similar program could significantly assist 
MHCs.  IMS permits advocates to collect reliable, standardized data 
about outcomes,304 allowing policymakers to prove the government’s 
fiscal responsibility by collecting and reporting information to the 
public.305  The results of this extensive research will inform taxpayers, 
stakeholders, and policymakers, attracting MHC community support 
and positive media coverage and strengthening the persuasive efforts 
of MHC advocates.306  Additionally, information permits court officials 
to recognize areas needing improvement within their own proce-
dures, while standardized statistics across jurisdictional boundaries 
will encourage MHC officials to implement successful practices from 
other jurisdictions practices. 
However, information accumulation is not enough.  Information 
must be shared among the numerous individuals and agencies in-
 
 298 Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1029 (citing LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, 
WHAT’S PROMISING 1 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 1998), available at http:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171676.pdf. 
 299 Leonard Post, Courts Mix Justice with Social Work; “Problem Solving” Programs 
Flourish, NAT’L L. J., June 7, 2004, at 1. 
 300 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4. 
 301 Berman & Gulick, supra note 295, at 1029. 
 302 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 4; cf. FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36 (examining 
IMS in the drug court context). 
 303 FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36. 
 304 See Kondo, supra note 47, at 285.  Objective factors capable of measurement for 
MHCs include the court’s docket clearing efficiency and the percentage of offenders 
selecting MHC participation over other tribunals.  Id. 
 305 FOX & WOLF, supra note 99, at 36–37. 
 306 See id. at 9. 
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volved in a MHC to create a successful collaboration.307  In its forma-
tive days, the Akron Mental Health Court experienced difficulties as 
information was not being shared among the treatment and criminal 
justice systems, frustrating all stakeholders.308  To correct the prob-
lem, the MHC created a database309 to incorporate the disparate, and 
often duplicative, information, allowing stakeholders to access accu-
rate and updated information concerning participants and their 
MHC interactions.310  The creation of a similar system, combined with 
IMS, will increase operating efficiency, while staving off future prob-
lems associated with MHC establishment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The pilot model of MHC establishment has failed.  Until plan-
ners recognize and accept this failure, newly created MHCs such as 
those in California, Florida, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see, Utah, and Washington will continue experiencing detrimental 
and existence-threatening growing pains. 
Since 1997, MHCs have proven their desirability, adaptability, 
feasibility, and viability.  The influx of mentally-ill offenders into the 
criminal justice system created a dynamic necessitating new solutions.  
The plight created by the “revolving door” of criminal justice com-
bined with increased judicial dissatisfaction produced an environ-
ment where MHCs can thrive.  This environment, combined with the 
flexible notions of problem-solving justice and MHCs’ initial success 
in reducing recidivism, allowed MHCs to populate jurisdictions na-
tionwide. 
Despite the positives, planners continue utilizing the pilot model 
of MHC creation, refusing to recognize MHC viability.  Planners 
should abandon the pilot model and instead implement strategies 
that will provide for MHCs’ continued success.  First, to secure future 
success, community support is essential.  Communication of a nu-
anced message through varied mediums will convince citizens, com-
munity groups, and policymakers of the importance and benefits of 
MHCs.  Second, numerous innovative and creative funding strategies 
must be implemented to ensure adequate funding.  Third, employ-
 
 307 Shoaf, supra note 31, at 993. 
 308 Id. at 988.  This lack of communication created a clash in regard to participant 
privacy rights and confidentiality.  Id.  The courts were frustrated by an inability to 
obtain information on a participant’s history and treatment from mental health 
treatment providers.  Id. 
 309 The database was known as a management information system.  Id. at 989. 
 310 Id. 
ACQUAVIVA FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  3:02:08 PM 
2006] COMMENT 1013 
ment incentives and adequate training are necessary to maintain and 
replenish personnel for uninterrupted MHC operation.  Finally, 
MHCs must adopt IMS to compute and coordinate data and research.  
Such information will improve the MHC operation and produce con-
crete data to be exploited in garnering media attention, securing 
funding, and encouraging stakeholder participation. 
By adopting and implementing these four strategies, advocates 
and planners will ensure MHCs’ continued success.  More impor-
tantly, such strategies will ensure the community’s safety and the 
criminal justice system’s efficacy, while helping those with mental ill-
ness conquer their diseases and contribute positively to society. 
 
